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Hurst v. Florida
14-7505
Ruling Below: Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 2009), cert granted
Hurst was convicted for the May 2, 1998, first-degree murder of Cynthia Harrison in a robbery at
the Popeye’s restaurant where Hurst was employed in Escambia County, Florida. Hurst’s
conviction and death sentence were originally affirmed in Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689 (Fla.
2002). The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the trial court's order denying relief as to the guilt
phase claims defendant raised. It reversed the trial court's order denying relief as to Hurst’s
penalty phase claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in investigation and presentation of
mental mitigation, vacated his sentence of death, and remanded for a new penalty phase
proceeding before a jury, which could consider evidence of aggravation and mitigation.
Question Presented: Whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment
or the Eighth Amendment in light of this Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona

Timothy Lee HURST
Appellant
v.
STATE of Florida
Appellee
Supreme Court of Florida
Decided on May 1, 2014
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
Per curium
Timothy Lee Hurst appeals his sentence of
death that was imposed for the 1998 firstdegree murder of Cynthia Harrison. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm his
sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the morning of May 2, 1998, a
murder and robbery occurred at a
Popeye’s Fried Chicken restaurant in

Escambia County, Florida, where
Hurst was employed. Hurst and the
victim, assistant manager Cynthia
Lee Harrison, were scheduled to work
at 8 a.m. on the day of the murder. A
worker at a nearby restaurant, Carl
Hess, testified that he saw Harrison
arriving at work between 7 a.m. and
8:30 a.m. Afterwards, Hess said that
he saw a man, who was about six feet
tall and weighed between 280 and
300 pounds, arrive at Popeye’s and
268

bang on the glass windows until he
was let inside. The man was dressed
in a Popeye’s uniform and Hess
recognized him as someone he had
seen working at Popeye’s. Shortly
after the crime, Hess picked Hurst
from a photographic lineup as the
man he had seen banging on the
windows. Hess was also able to
identify Hurst at trial.
On the morning of the murder, a
Popeye’s delivery truck was making
the rounds at Popeye’s restaurants in
the area. Janet Pugh, who worked at
another Popeye’s, testified she
telephoned Harrison at 7:55 a.m. to
tell her that the delivery truck had just
left and Harrison should expect the
truck soon. Pugh spoke to the victim
for four to five minutes and did not
detect that there was anything wrong
or hear anyone in the background.
Pugh was certain of the time because
she looked at the clock while on the
phone.
Popeye’s was scheduled to open at
10:30 a.m. but Harrison and Hurst
were the only employees scheduled to
work at 8 a.m. However, at some
point before opening, two other
Popeye’s employees arrived, in
addition to the driver of the supply
truck. None of them saw Hurst or his
car. At 10:30 a.m., another Popeye’s
assistant manager, Tonya Crenshaw,
arrived and found the two Popeye’s
employees and the truck driver
waiting outside the locked restaurant.
When Crenshaw unlocked the door,
and she and the delivery driver
entered, they discovered that the safe
was unlocked and open, and the
previous day’s receipts, as well as
$375 in small bills and change, were

missing. The driver discovered the
victim’s dead body inside the freezer.
The victim had her hands bound
behind her back with black electrical
tape and she also had tape over her
mouth. Similar tape was later found in
the trunk of Hurst’s car. The scene
was covered with a significant
amount of the victim’s blood, and it
was apparent from water on the floor
that someone had attempted to clean
up the area. The victim suffered a
minimum of sixty incised slash and
stab wounds, including severe
wounds to the face, neck, back, torso,
and arms. The victim also had blood
stains on the knees of her pants,
indicating that she had been kneeling
in her blood. A forensic pathologist,
Dr. Michael Berkland, testified that
some of the wounds cut through the
tissue into the underlying bone, and
while several wounds had the
potential to be fatal, the victim
probably would not have survived
more than fifteen minutes after the
wounds were inflicted. Dr. Berkland
also testified that the victim’s wounds
were consistent with the use of a box
cutter. A box cutter was found on a
baker’s rack close to the victim’s
body. Later testing showed that the
box cutter had the victim’s blood on
it. It was not the type of box cutter that
was used at Popeye’s, but was similar
to a box cutter that Hurst had been
seen with several days before the
crime.
Hurst’s friend, Michael Williams,
testified that Hurst admitted to him
that he had killed Harrison. Hurst told
him that he had an argument with the
victim, she “retaliated,” and that
Hurst hit the victim and cut her with a
box cutter. Hurst said he had killed
the victim because, “he didn’t want
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the woman to see his face.” Williams
stated that Hurst had talked about
robbing Popeye’s on previous
occasions.
Another of Hurst’s friends, “LeeLee” Smith, testified that the night
before the murder, Hurst said he was
going to rob Popeye’s. On the
morning of the murder, Hurst came to
Smith’s house with a plastic container
full of money from the Popeye’s safe.
Hurst instructed Smith to keep the
money for him. Hurst said he had
killed the victim and put her in the
freezer. Smith washed Hurst’s pants,
which had blood on them, and threw
away Hurst’s socks and shoes. Later
that morning, Smith and Hurst went
to Wal-Mart to purchase a new pair of
shoes. They also went to a pawn shop
where Hurst saw some rings he liked,
and after returning to Smith’s house
for the stolen money, Hurst returned
to the shop and purchased the three
rings for $300. An employee at the
shop, Bob Little, testified that on the
day of the murder, a man fitting
Hurst’s description purchased three
rings. Little picked Hurst out of a
photographic lineup as the man who
had purchased the rings. The police
recovered the three rings from Hurst.
Smith’s parents were out of town the
weekend of the murder but upon their
return, and after discovering the
container with the money from
Popeye’s in Smith’s room, Smith’s
mother contacted the police and
turned the container over to them. The
police interviewed Smith and
searched a garbage can in Smith’s
yard where they found a coin purse
that contained the victim’s driver’s
license and other property, a bank bag
marked with “Popeye’s” and the

victim’s name, a bank deposit slip, a
sock with blood stains on it, and a
sheet of notebook paper marked “Lee
Smith, language lab.” On the back of
the notebook paper someone had
added several numbers, and one
number was the same as the amount
on the deposit slip. Smith’s father also
gave the police a pair of size fourteen
shoes that appeared to have blood
stains on them and that he had
retrieved from the same trash can.
Jack Remus, a Florida Department of
Law Enforcement (FDLE) crime lab
analyst, testified that the shoes were
tested with phenolpthalein to detect
blood, and while the test results
exhibited some of the chemical
indications associated with blood,
attempts at DNA testing were not
successful. Remus also tested the
blood-stained sock and determined
that the DNA typing was consistent
with the victim. Hurst’s pants were
also tested, but no blood evidence was
detected. FDLE fingerprint expert
Paul Norkus testified that the deposit
slip in the garbage can had three of
Hurst’s fingerprints on it. At trial, the
State played the tape of an interview
the police had conducted with Hurst
shortly after the murder. Hurst said
that on the morning of the murder he
was on his way to work and his car
broke down. He said that he
telephoned Harrison at Popeye’s to
say he was unable to come to work,
and when he talked to her, she
sounded scared and he heard
whispering in the background. Hurst
then went to Smith’s house and
changed out of his work clothes.
Hurst said he went to the pawn shop
and bought necklaces for friends, but
he did not mention purchasing the

270

three rings or buying a new pair of
shoes at Wal-Mart.
At the close of the guilt phase of the
trial, the jury deliberated for
approximately six hours before
finding Hurst guilty of first-degree
murder.
Hurst
filed
his
initial,
amended
postconviction proceeding in circuit court.
On appeal from denial of postconviction
relief, we affirmed on all but one of his
postconviction claims. Although we
concluded that the State should have
disclosed certain field notes by investigator
Donald Nesmith, and that the trial court’s
refusal to perpetuate the testimony of Willie
Griffin was an abuse of discretion, we
concluded no prejudice accrued from those
errors. However, we reversed the denial of
relief on Hurst’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel in investigation and
presentation of mitigation in the penalty
phase, and remanded for a new penalty phase
proceeding. In granting a new penalty phase,
we explained that there was no sound basis
for Hurst’s defense counsel to have failed to
investigate and present evidence of Hurst’s
borderline intelligence, possible organic
brain damage, the fact that he was in special
education classes as a child, and other
mitigation for which there appeared to be no
apparent disadvantage in presentation.
Prior to the new sentencing trial, the trial
court denied Hurst’s successive motion for an
evidentiary hearing on mental retardation. In
addition, the court denied Hurst’s request to
present mental retardation to the penalty
phase jury as an absolute bar to
recommendation of a death sentence,

although the court allowed him to present
mental retardation and other mental issues as
mitigation to the jury. After the new penalty
phase evidence was presented, in which the
State presented an abbreviated version of the
trial testimony as to the circumstances of the
murder, and after the defense presented
testimony concerning mitigation, the jury
returned a recommendation of death by a
seven-to-five vote.
Before sentencing, the trial court held a
Spencer hearing at which defense counsel
presented further argument that the evidence
at the penalty phase established that Hurst
was mentally retarded. The trial court
subsequently entered a sentencing order
sentencing Hurst to death. In doing so, the
court found as aggravating factors that (1) the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel, which was assigned great weight; and
(2) the murder was committed while Hurst
was engaged in commission of a robbery,
which was assigned great weight. In
mitigation, the trial court found the following
two statutory mitigators: (1) no significant
history of prior criminal activity, which was
assigned moderate weight; and (2) Hurst’s
age of 19 and his young mental age, which
was assigned moderate weight.
The trial court found as additional mitigation
that Hurst had significant mental issues—
limited mental and intellectual capacity with
widespread abnormalities in his brain
affecting impulse control and judgment
consistent with fetal alcohol syndrome,
which was assigned moderate weight—
although the court expressly found that Hurst
is not mentally retarded. The trial court
rejected as unproven proffered mitigating
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factors that the defendant was under the
influence of mental or emotional disturbance;
the defendant was an accomplice with
relatively minor participation; the defendant
acted under extreme duress or substantial
domination of another; or the defendant
lacked the capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
Hurst took a timely appeal from the sentence
of death raising the following issues: (1)
whether the trial court erred in refusing to
give him a separate evidentiary hearing on his
successive mental retardation claim, in
refusing to allow the jury to determine mental
retardation as a bar to execution, and in
finding after trial that he is not mentally
retarded and exempt from execution; (2)
whether this Court should recede from
precedent holding that the jury need not
expressly find specific aggravators or issue a
unanimous advisory verdict on the sentence;
and (3) whether his death sentence is
proportionate. We turn to Hurst’s first issue
on appeal.
ANALYSIS
A. Mental Retardation Issues
The United States Supreme Court held in
Atkins v. Virginia, that the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution
forbids execution of mentally retarded
defendants. However, the Supreme Court left
it to the states to determine the manner in
which this constitutional restriction on
execution of its sentences will be enforced.
Florida law sets forth a three-pronged test to
determine mental retardation as a bar to the

death penalty. In order to prove mental
retardation as a bar to execution, the
defendant must prove all three of the
following
factors:
(1)
significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning,
which has been interpreted to be a full scale
IQ of 70 or below on a standardized
intelligence test; (2) concurrent deficits in
adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of
the condition before age eighteen. The
burden is on the defendant raising a claim of
mental retardation as a bar to execution to
prove mental retardation by clear and
convincing evidence.
Hurst contends that the trial court erred in
denying a successive mental retardation
hearing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.203. He contends that he is
mentally retarded and exempt from execution
based on a recent Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition (WAISIV) test that indicated his full scale IQ is 69,
and based on expert testimony that he
suffered from adaptive deficits—all before
age eighteen—such that he met the statutory
requirements for mental retardation. Hurst
was previously provided a full evidentiary
hearing on the question of mental retardation
in his initial postconviction proceeding. At
that evidentiary hearing, Hurst presented the
expert testimony of Dr. Valerie McClain, a
licensed
clinical
psychologist,
who
administered a number of tests to Hurst,
including the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of
Intelligence (WASI). That test placed Hurst
in the borderline range with a full scale IQ
score of 70. As to deficits in adaptive
functioning, Dr. McClain testified that in her
opinion Hurst did not meet the adaptive
functioning deficit threshold for mental
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retardation, and she did not determine that
Hurst is mentally retarded. At that same
evidentiary hearing, the State presented
clinical psychologist Dr. James D. Larsen.
After testing Hurst with the WAIS-III test,
Dr. Larsen concluded that Hurst’s full scale
IQ was 78. Dr. Larsen also found no deficits
in adaptive functioning necessary for a
diagnosis of mental retardation. The circuit
court in that initial postconviction proceeding
denied the mental retardation claim, relying
primarily on the testimony of Dr. McClain
and Dr. Larsen that Hurst’s adaptive behavior
was not substantially impaired; however, no
appeal was taken of that ruling when it was
denied in 2007.
In this case, Hurst contends that the trial court
should have held a second Atkins mental
retardation hearing prior to the new
sentencing trial. The trial court denied the
request for a pretrial evidentiary hearing on
several grounds, one of which was that the
motion was untimely under the requirements
of rule 3.203. We conclude that denial of the
request for a second Atkins hearing was not
an abuse of discretion under the
circumstances present in this case. Moreover,
any error in denying the pretrial evidentiary
hearing on mental retardation was harmless
because Hurst was allowed to present all his
mental retardation evidence at the penalty
phase, after which the trial court ruled that he
failed to establish that he is mentally
retarded. The background and mental
mitigation evidence presented by Hurst at the
penalty phase is discussed next.
Hurt’s sister, Sequester “Tina” Hurst;
brother, Jermaine Bradley; mother, Bertha
Bradley; father, Timothy Bradley; Bible

study teacher, Isaac Sheppard; administrator
at Hurst’s high school, Calvin Harris; and
former United States Army Major and
principal of East Charter School, Jerome
Chism, all testified concerning Hurst’s
family and background. Hurst’s mother was
age fifteen when Hurst was born and, during
pregnancy, she drank all day, every day.
As a child Hurst stuttered and developed very
slowly. As a toddler, he was slow to learn to
walk. He was disciplined harshly when he
was growing up and was punished more than
the other children because he could not do
things correctly.
Hurst was a fun-loving child and teenager
with a good personality. He liked to play
jokes and was mild tempered, but was slow
mentally and did very poorly in school. In
Bible study classes as a child, Hurst was
unable to progress out of the most basic
children’s Bible study book and could not
look up the Bible verses that went with the
stories. He was embarrassed because he had
difficulty reading. Hurst should have been in
special education classes because he was low
functioning and could not understand what
was going on in class; and for that reason, he
would skip class and play basketball in the
gym. Even though his school wanted to place
Hurst in a special education program, his
mother objected because she was afraid he
would be picked on. He did go to East Charter
School, which taught low achievers and
children with behavioral problems, and while
there, was teased about his large size and his
slowness. His maturity level remained very
low and even at age eighteen, he exhibited the
maturity of a middle-school student. Hurst
could not obtain a GED, but did have a
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driver’s license and obtained a car with his
father’s help, although he was a poor driver.
Family members testified that Hurst had to be
reminded to take care of himself; and he
allowed his mother and sister to wash his
clothes, and allowed his mother to cook for
him. He had poor hygiene and had to be
reminded to bathe and dress appropriately.
He had to be reminded to keep appointments
and be awakened for work. Hurst did not
have a checking account and would likely
have had difficulty making change if he was
working a cash register. However, Hurst was
employed at Popeye’s and did food “prep
work.”
Dr. Joseph Wu, a psychiatrist, professor of
psychiatry, and clinical director of the
University of California at Irvine College of
Medicine Brain Imaging Center, testified as
an expert on the use of positron emission
tomography (PET) in regard to neurological
and psychiatric disorders. He was present
when a PET scan was performed on Hurst
and later interpreted the results of that PET
scan. Dr. Wu testified that the scan showed a
decreased cortical cerebellum metabolic rate,
which indicated widespread damage to the
cortical region of Hurst’s brain. He opined
that Hurst has widespread abnormalities in
multiple areas of his brain, which
abnormalities are associated with lack of
judgment, risk taking, impulsivity, and
immaturity. Dr. Wu was aware that it was
reported Hurst suffered from fetal alcohol
syndrome, which, along with other trauma,
can cause the types of problems seen in
Hurst’s PET scan, although he could not say
from the PET scan what caused the
abnormalities in Hurst’s brain.

Dr. Harry Krop, a clinical and forensic
psychologist, testified that he administered
the WAIS-IV test, as well as a test of memory
malingering (TOMM), to Hurst in January
and February 2012. The testing resulted in a
full scale IQ of 69, which is in the range of
mental retardation. Dr. Krop reviewed details
of the murder, Hurst’s regular school records,
the charter school records, Florida
Department of Corrections records, tests and
reports of other testing performed on Hurst,
and Dr. Wu’s PET scan report. He also spoke
to various family members for the purpose of
evaluating Hurst’s adaptive functioning as
measured by completion of the Adaptive
Behavior Assessment System (ABAS). He
did not listen to the recorded statement Hurst
gave to police. After reviewing the
questionnaire for the ABAS, which was
completed by Hurst and three family
members, Dr. Krop concluded that Hurst is
significantly deficient in all areas of adaptive
functioning. Dr. Krop was aware of earlier
testing in which Hurst scored in the 78 IQ
range on a different WAIS test, which Dr.
Krop opined was not as accurate as the newer
WAIS-IV, and his final opinion was that
Hurst is mentally retarded.
Dr. Gordon Taub, psychologist and associate
professor at the University of Central Florida
specializing in measurement of intelligence,
structure of intelligence, intelligence theory,
and evaluation of intelligence tests, testified
that he has written articles about the
Wechsler Scale of Intelligence tests. He
testified that the WAIS-IV, which was
revised in 2008, now measures four areas of
intelligence, made changes in the subtests,
and added some completely new tests. Dr.
Taub was aware that Hurst received a full
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scale IQ score of 78 on the earlier WAIS-III
test in 2004, which he said tested for only two
main factors. He agreed that on the WAIS-IV
test, which was given by Dr. Krop and which
tests for four main factors, Hurst received a
full scale score of 69. Dr. Taub opined that
scores on the current WAIS-IV and earlier
Wechsler tests cannot properly be compared
because of the changes to the newer test and
because the WAIS-IV is a much better test.
However, Dr. Taub agreed that the WAIS-III
is a “valid score of intelligence and there’s no
reason not to use that score if you attained it
at the time that it was the test to use to
measure intelligence.”
Dr. Taub testified that other testing done on
Hurst when he was under the age of eighteen
and still in school showed depressed scores.
As to Hurst’s adaptive functioning, Dr. Taub
testified that the information gathered by Dr.
Krop showed Hurst was impaired in
functioning in the real world in areas of selfcare and in communication. Dr. Taub
administered the Woodcock Johnson Test of
Achievement, Third Edition, to Hurst, which
tests areas in reading, writing, math, and
spelling. He opined that Hurst’s limited
proficiency shown on the achievement test is
consistent with his school records showing
low performance. He concluded based on the
WAIS-IV test and on information concerning
Hurst’s adaptive functioning, school records,
and achievement testing, that Hurst meets the
legal criteria for mental retardation in
Florida.
The State presented the testimony of Dr.
Harry McClaren, forensic psychologist, who
testified that he reviewed court documents,
the testimony of Hurst’s family members, the

testimony of Drs. McClain and Larson at the
prior evidentiary hearing, mental health
records from the Department of Corrections,
educational records and school test results,
information about the crime, Hurst’s
statement to police, and the testimony of Drs.
Taub and Krop. Dr. McClaren also reviewed
a WAIS-III test given to Hurst by a Dr.
Riebsame in 2003 and the WASI (Wechsler
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence) given by
Dr. McClain in 2004. He testified that it
would be a mistake to ignore Hurst’s past
testing with the WAIS-III resulting in full
scale IQ scores of 76 and 78 because that test
was the state of the art instrument at the time.
Dr. McClaren also testified that there was no
adaptive behavior testing done when Hurst
was young, and now the reports of his deficits
are anecdotal. He opined that Hurst does not
meet the criteria for mental retardation.
The trial court relied primarily on the
testimony of Dr. McClaren and on evidence
of Hurst’s actions in and around the time of
the crime in determining that Hurst did not
meet the test for mental retardation as a bar to
the death penalty. In addition to testimony of
members of law enforcement who
investigated the crime and recovered
evidence from Lee-Lee Smith’s house, the
State presented Hurst’s statement given to
detectives at the time. After Hurst signed a
waiver of his rights and agreed he was
speaking voluntarily with the detectives, he
gave a narrative of what he said he did that
morning in which he described going to a
friend’s house to unsuccessfully try to use the
telephone because, he said, his car broke
down. He gave street directions to that
friend’s house. Hurst said he then went to the
E-Z Serve to use the pay telephone to call
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Popeye’s and tell Cynthia Harrison he would
not be able to come into work. He said that
she spoke “in a scary voice” with a “scary
tone,” and he could hear some whispering in
the background. He recited the telephone
number that he called to talk with her. Hurst
also related to detectives that he went to LeeLee Smith’s house that morning, and then to
his own house where his brother Jermaine
asked Hurst to take him to a pawn shop. Hurst
described putting something in his car to
clean out the gas tank and then driving to the
pawn shop with Jermaine, Lee-Lee, and
another young man. Hurst said in his
statement that he bought his brother two
necklaces at the pawn shop with his brother’s
money. Hurst told detectives that after
leaving Lee-Lee Smith’s house and before
going to the pawn shop, he changed his shirt
and shoes but not his work pants. Timothy
Bradley, Hurst’s biological father, testified
that on the morning of May 2, 1998, at around
7:45 a.m., he saw Hurst putting the battery
back into his car after the battery had been on
the charger all night. At that time, Hurst was
wearing his Popeye’s uniform.
The trial court concluded in the sentencing
order that Hurst was able to maintain a job
and had acquired a driver’s license. The court
noted that Hurst’s statement to police and his
efforts to conceal his involvement in the
crime were particularly persuasive in
determining that Hurst did not suffer
significant deficits in adaptive functioning.
The court stated, “The statement, given
shortly after the crime, reveals an individual
clearly recounting a morning’s events, giving
directions, recalling telephone numbers, and
deliberately omitting certain information
tending to incriminate him. Similarly, the

evidence offered at trial suggests that
Defendant took numerous steps to conceal
his involvement in the crime by attempting to
clean the murder scene, having his clothes
washed, hiding the money in another
location,
discarding
Ms.
Harrison’s
belongings and his shoes, and buying new
shoes.” We also note that evidence that Hurst
was a nineteen-year-old who still lived at
home and allowed his mother and sister to
cook for him and do his laundry does not
establish that he is unable to care for himself.
Because the trial court had before it
competent, substantial evidence to support its
conclusion that Hurst is not mentally retarded
under the three-prong test set forth in Florida
law, we find no error in this ruling.
Although Hurst was allowed to present all his
mental retardation and other mental
mitigation to the jury, he also contends that
the trial court erred in refusing to submit the
question of mental retardation as a bar to the
death penalty to the jury for its determination.
This claim lacks merit. We have repeatedly
held that a defendant has no right under
Atkins to a jury determination of whether he
is mentally retarded. Florida is not one of
those states, and the United States Supreme
Court has not mandated any specific
procedure for making the determination of
mental retardation in the capital sentencing
context. Thus, the trial court did not err in
refusing to submit to the jury the question of
Hurst’s mental retardation as a bar to the
death penalty in this case.
B. Lack of Jury Findings as to Specific
Aggravators and Lack of a Unanimous
Advisory Verdict on the Sentence
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Hurst next contends that constitutional error
occurred in his case because the advisory jury
in the penalty phase was not required to find
specific facts as to the aggravating factors,
and that the jury was not required to make a
unanimous recommendation as to the
sentence. In this case, the jury voted seven to
five to recommend a death sentence be
imposed. Hurst bases his claims on the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Ring, which held that capital defendants are
entitled to a jury determination of any fact on
which the legislature conditions an increase
in the maximum punishment. Hurst
recognizes that our precedent has repeatedly
held that Ring does not require the jury to
make specific findings of the aggravators or
to make a unanimous jury recommendation
as to sentence, and he asks us to revisit our
precedent on the issue in the decisions in
Bottoson v. Moore and King v. Moore. In the
plurality decisions in both cases, we rejected
claims that Ring applied to Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme. We decline to revisit
those decisions in this case.
Hurst contends that the facts of this case
support a conclusion that Ring applies to
require the jury to expressly find one or more
aggravators and to issue its recommendation
based on a unanimous advisory verdict. He
contends that this case is distinguishable
from cases where a jury has unanimously
found an aggravating factor such as
conviction of a prior violent felony or that the
murder was committed in the course of
committing, attempting to commit, or flight
after commission of a separate enumerated
felony. There is no prior violent felony
aggravator in this case, nor did this jury
convict Hurst of a contemporaneous felony

such as robbery. However, we have rejected
the Ring claim in similarly situated cases.
We previously rejected the invitation to
revisit our decisions in Bottoson and King in
Peterson v. State, a case which also did not
involve conviction for a prior violent felony
or a contemporaneous enumerated felony,
and did not involve a unanimous jury
advisory verdict. There, the majority stated,
“We have consistently rejected claims that
Florida’s death
penalty statute is
unconstitutional.” Similarly, in Butler v.
State, this Court rejected the Ring claim
where there was no aggravating factor based
on a prior violent felony conviction and there
was no unanimous jury advisory sentence.
We continue to adhere to this same body of
precedent.
We also note that the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in Evans v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t.
of Corrections, reversed a federal district
court’s ruling that Florida’s sentencing
scheme violates Ring. The Eleventh Circuit
noted that the United States Supreme Court’s
“last word in a Florida capital case on the
constitutionality of that state’s death
sentencing procedures” came in Hildwin v.
Florida, which predated Ring. Evans. This
Court, in Hildwin v. State, rejected the claim
that
the
sentencing
scheme
was
unconstitutional because the jury is not
required to make specific findings
authorizing the imposition of the death
penalty. On review, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed our decision in
Hildwin and stated, “[T]he Sixth Amendment
does not require that the specific findings
authorizing the imposition of the sentence of
death be made by the jury.” As the Eleventh
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Circuit noted in Evans, the United States
Supreme Court has never expressly overruled
Hildwin, and did not do so in Ring. The Evans
court also agreed with the State that Florida’s
sentencing procedures do provide for jury
input about the existence of aggravating
factors prior to sentencing—a process that
was completely lacking in the Arizona statute
struck down in Ring. For all these reasons, we
reject Hurst’s claim that Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under
Ring.
C. Proportionality
Hurst next contends that the death sentence in
this case is not proportional because it is not
one of the most aggravated and least
mitigated of first-degree murders, thus
requiring that his death sentence be reduced
to life in prison. He contends that a life
sentence should be imposed based on
evidence of abnormalities in his brain due to
fetal alcohol syndrome, his low mental
functioning, and other mental and
background mitigation. In performing the
proportionality review, this Court has
explained:
“[W]e make a comprehensive
analysis in order to determine
whether the crime falls within the
category of both the most aggravated
and the least mitigated of murders,
thereby assuring uniformity in the
application of the sentence.” We
consider the totality of the
circumstances of the case and
compare the case to other capital
cases. This entails “a qualitative
review by this Court of the underlying
basis for each aggravator and
mitigator rather than a quantitative

analysis.”
In
other
words,
proportionality review “is not a
comparison between the number of
aggravating
and
mitigating
circumstances.”
This Court has long recognized an obligation
to perform a proportionality review.
In reviewing proportionality, this Court
follows precedent that requires that the death
penalty be “reserved only for those cases
where the most aggravating and least
mitigating circumstances exist.” In doing so,
we “will not disturb the sentencing judge’s
determination as to ‘the relative weight to
give to each established mitigator’ where that
ruling is ‘supported by competent, substantial
evidence in the record.’” We “review the
weight the trial court ascribes to mitigating
factors under the abuse of discretion
standard.” The Court will also “affirm the
weight given an aggravator if based on
competent substantial evidence.” “The
weight to be given aggravating factors is
within the discretion of the trial court, and it
is subject to the abuse of discretion standard.”
Hurst contends, inter alia, that his case is
similar to Cooper v. State, in which the Court
vacated the death sentence and imposed a life
sentence on the basis of lack of
proportionality when compared to other
capital cases. In Cooper, the evidence
showed the defendant was eighteen years old
at the time of the crime. Cooper also suffered
from borderline mental retardation, brain
damage likely caused by beatings and head
trauma as a child, a history of seizures,
schizophrenia, cognitive brain impairment,
and an abusive childhood including being
repeatedly threatened with a gun by his
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father. The trial court in Cooper found three
aggravators and two statutory mitigators, as
well as other nonstatutory mitigation. We
conclude that although there was more
aggravation in Cooper, there was also more
mitigation than is present in this case. Cooper
does not require us to find Hurst’s sentence
disproportionate.
The State relies on Jeffries v. State, as a basis
on which to find the sentence in this case
proportional. In Jeffries, the murder occurred
in a somewhat similar manner to the instant
case—the victim was stabbed, suffering
multiple sharp force injuries, and was beaten.
The trial court found two aggravators, murder
in course of commission of a robbery and
HAC. The mitigation included findings that
the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct was impaired, that
the codefendant was equally culpable and
received a plea deal for a twenty-year
sentence, and that Jeffries had a long history
of emotional and mental problems, as well as
drug and alcohol abuse. We held that the
death sentence in Jeffries was proportional
when compared to other capital cases.
More recently, in Allen v. State, we found the
death sentence proportionate. The victim was
bound and had chemicals poured on her face.
Allen beat the victim with belts, put a belt
around her neck and, in spite of her pleas to
stop, strangled her. The autopsy also revealed
facial bruising, bruising on the torso, hand,
thigh, knee, and shoulder; and the victim had
contusions on her hands, face, and torso. Her
hands showed ligature marks from having
been tied, and her neck showed signs of
ligature.

The trial court in Allen found two
aggravators—commission of the murder in
the course of committing or attempting to
commit a kidnapping, and that the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
The nonstatutory mitigation found by the
court included that Allen had been the victim
of physical and possibly sexual abuse, had
brain damage due to numerous prior head
injuries resulting in lack of impulse control,
suffered a poor childhood environment, and
exhibited helpfulness. The evidence also
showed that Allen had significant organic
brain damage and intracranial injuries, and
was at the lower end of intellectual capacity.
Testimony was received that a PET scan
revealed at least ten brain injuries, mostly to
the right side of Allen’s brain which would
affect impulse control, judgment, and mood,
and would make it hard for her to conform
her conduct to the requirements of society.
We found the death sentence in Allen
proportionate when compared to sentences in
other capital cases.
Similarly, in Rogers v. State, the victim was
murdered by being brutally stabbed, and had
bruises, abrasions, and a shallow defensive
wound to her arm. The trial court found two
aggravators—that the murder was committed
for pecuniary gain and that it was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The court found
one statutory mitigator—that the defendant’s
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially
impaired. This last mitigating factor was
based on the trial court’s finding that Rogers
suffers from psychosis and brain damage that
may have been exacerbated by long-term
alcohol abuse. The trial court found other
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mitigation in Rogers’ difficult family
background, abusive childhood, and his
exhibition of good qualities as a father and
employee. We upheld the death sentence in
Rogers as proportionate.
Based on the forgoing, we find that Hurst’s
death sentence, when compared to the death
sentences in other comparable capital cases,
is proportionate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm
Hurst’s sentence of death for the first-degree
murder of Cynthia Harrison.
It is so ordered.
POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and
CANADY, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J.,
concurs in part and dissents in part with an
opinion, in which LABARGA and PERRY,
JJ., concur. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME
EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION,
AND
IF
FILED,
DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Hurst a successive mental
retardation hearing pursuant to Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.203 prior to the new
sentencing proceeding. I dissent, however,
from the majority’s affirmance of Hurst’s
sentence of death because there was no
unanimous jury finding of either of the two
aggravating circumstances found by the trial
judge—that the murder was heinous,

atrocious, or cruel; and that the murder was
committed in the course of a robbery.
No jury ever convicted Hurst of the
contemporaneous robbery, so this case does
not fall within the exception to the
constitutional requirement of juror unanimity
for a contemporaneous felony conviction or a
prior violent felony conviction as an
aggravating
circumstance,
which
automatically demonstrate that the jury has
made the necessary findings to warrant the
possibility of a death sentence.
In Hurst’s case, the jury recommended death
by the slimmest margin permitted under
Florida law—a bare majority seven-to-five
vote. Because a penalty-phase jury in Florida
is not required to make specific factual
findings as to the aggravating circumstances
necessary to impose the death penalty
pursuant to Florida’s capital sentencing
statute, it is actually possible that there was
not even a majority of jurors who agreed that
the same aggravator applied. In my view,
Hurst’s death sentence cannot be
constitutionally imposed, consistent with the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Ring v. Arizona, and Florida’s right to trial by
jury, in the absence of a unanimous finding
by the jury that any of the applicable
aggravators apply, which is not present here.
I have previously expressed my view that
“[t]he absence of a requirement of a
unanimous jury finding as a precondition to a
sentence of death is . . . a matter of
constitutional significance.” Indeed, I
continue to believe that, in light of Ring,
Florida’s death penalty statute, as applied in
circumstances like those presented in this
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case where there is no unanimous jury
finding as to any of the aggravating
circumstances, is unconstitutional.
As I stated in my opinion dissenting as to the
affirmance of the death sentence in Peterson:
“Under our current sentencing
scheme, not all defendants who are
convicted of first-degree murder are
eligible for a sentence of death. The
trial judge must make additional
findings before the death penalty can
be imposed. Without these findings, a
trial court cannot impose a higher
sentence than life imprisonment on
the basis of the verdict alone. It is
only after a sentencing hearing and
additional findings of fact regarding
aggravators and mitigators that the
sentence of death may be imposed.
Not only is this requirement imposed
by Florida law, but it is
constitutionally mandated by the
Eighth Amendment to prevent death
sentences from being arbitrarily
imposed.
In addition, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court in Ring,
the Sixth Amendment requires that a
jury find those aggravating factors.
As Justice Scalia explained in his
concurring opinion in Ring, the
bottom line is that “the fundamental
meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of
the Sixth Amendment is that all facts
essential to imposition of the level of
punishment that the defendant
receives—whether the statute calls
them elements of the offense,
sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—
must be found by a jury.”
“Apart from capital sentencing, the
requirement of unanimity has been

scrupulously honored in the criminal law of
this state for any finding of guilt and for any
fact
that
increases
the
maximum
punishment.” “Florida’s exclusion of the
death penalty from the requirement of jury
unanimity cannot be reconciled” with the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Ring that “[t]he
right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment
would
be
senselessly
diminished if it encompassed the factfinding
necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence
by two years, but not the factfinding
necessary to put him to death,” and that “the
Sixth Amendment applies to both.”
It remains my view that Ring requires any
fact that qualifies a capital defendant for a
sentence of death to be found by a jury, and
that Florida’s state constitutional right to trial
by jury, which is embodied in article I,
section 22, of the Florida Constitution,
“requires a unanimous jury finding beyond a
reasonable doubt on the existence of any
element necessary to increase an authorized
punishment, most especially the ultimate
punishment of the death penalty.” In other
words, article I, section 22, is violated in the
rare case where the death penalty is imposed
without any of the aggravators that
automatically demonstrate that a jury has
made the necessary findings to warrant the
possibility of a death sentence, such as a prior
violent felony conviction or that the murder
occurred while in the course of an
enumerated felony that was also found by a
jury. This is one of those rare cases.
This case also illustrates how the use of a
special verdict form would help solve the
problem, as Hurst’s counsel requested an
interrogatory verdict to specify the
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aggravators found by the jury and the votes
on each, but the motion was denied in
accordance with this Court’s case law
preventing the use of penalty-phase special
verdict forms detailing the jurors’
determination
concerning
aggravating
factors. Had the jury been permitted to
specify its findings, it is possible that this
Court would have evidence in the record that
Hurst’s jury unanimously found the existence
of one of the aggravators found by the trial
judge in imposing the death sentence, thereby
curing the constitutional infirmity in this
case. Because the jury was not permitted to
indicate its findings, however, this evidence
does not appear in our record.
I have previously expressed my view as to the
“difficulties created” by this Court’s
decisions that fail to allow or mandate the use
of special interrogatories in death penalty
cases to permit the jury to make special
findings as to the aggravators. I once again
renew this position here, as the use of a
special verdict form during the penalty phase
would enable this Court “to tell when a jury
has unanimously found a death-qualifying
aggravating circumstance, which would both
facilitate our proportionality review and
satisfy the constitutional guarantee of trial by
jury even when the recommendation of death
is less than unanimous.”
Finally, I also take this opportunity to note an
evolving concern as to the possible Eighth
Amendment implications of Florida’s outlier
status, among those decreasing number of
states that still retain the death penalty, on the
issue of jury unanimity in death penalty
cases. Except for Florida, every state that
imposes the death penalty, as well as the

federal system, requires a unanimous jury
verdict as to the finding of an aggravating
circumstance. This means that in no other
state or federal court in the country would
Hurst have been sentenced to death in this
case in the absence of a unanimous jury
finding of an aggravating circumstance.
Florida is a clear outlier.
In Steele, this Court urged the Legislature to
reexamine Florida’s capital sentencing
statute in light of Ring and Florida’s outlier
status. I have also previously echoed this
suggestion, encouraging the Legislature to
bring Florida “closer to the mainstream of
capital sentencing states in regard to jury
findings.”
Although those calls for legislative action
have arisen primarily due to Ring and Sixth
Amendment
concerns,
the
Eighth
Amendment ramifications of Florida’s
outlier status are also clear. For example, two
Justices on the United States Supreme Court
have recently expressed “deep concerns”
about the federal constitutionality of
Alabama’s death penalty statute in light of its
outlier status on the issue of jury overrides.
The United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly explained that “death is different”
from every other form of punishment. The
Supreme Court has also emphasized the
“heightened reliability demanded by the
Eighth Amendment in the determination
whether the death penalty is appropriate in a
particular case.” As this Court has pointed
out, “[m]any courts and scholars have
recognized the value of unanimous verdicts,”
particularly given that the “reliability” of
death sentences “depends on adhering to
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guided procedures that promote a reasoned
judgment by the trier of fact.” While
questions of public policy regarding Florida’s
capital sentencing statute are left to the
Legislature, the Sixth and Eighth
Amendment implications of Florida’s outlier
status on the lack of jury unanimity, which
threaten to unravel our entire death penalty
scheme, should be of serious concern. I once
again urge the Legislature, as has former
Justice Cantero, to revisit this issue in
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme.
For all these reasons, I dissent from the
majority’s affirmance of Hurst’s death
sentence because there is no unanimous
finding by the jury that any of the applicable
aggravators apply. The absence of juror
unanimity in the fact-finding necessary to
impose the death penalty remains, in my
view, an independent violation of Florida’s
constitutional right to trial by jury.
LABARGA and PERRY, JJ., concur.
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“Supreme Court to Review Florida’s Capital Punishment System”
The Wall Street Journal
Jess Bravin
March 9, 2015
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
review whether Florida’s capital punishment
system too easily allows juries to recommend
the execution of criminals.
Florida permits executions based on divided
jury votes and doesn’t require a jury to make
specific findings regarding the aggravating
factors that can justify death. The high court
is to decide whether those practices violate of
the U.S. Constitution. Alabama is the only
other state that allows a divided jury vote for
the death penalty.
The case involves Timothy Hurst, 36, who
was convicted of the 1998 murder of his
manager, Cynthia Harrison, while robbing
the Popeye’s fast-food restaurant where he
worked. He was sentenced to death by the
jury’s 7-5 vote. Among other issues, Mr.
Hurst’s appeal to the Supreme Court argued
Florida didn’t adequately consider his claims
of intellectual disability, and that the jury rule
allowing a divided vote was unconstitutional.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Mr.
Hurst’s death sentence, ruling the state’s
sentencing system wasn’t subject to Ring v.
Arizona, a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision
requiring that jurors, rather than a judge
acting alone, determine whether aggravating
factors justified executing a defendant.

The Ring decision “says a jury has to make a
unanimous determination regarding any
factor in a criminal trial that has the effect of
increasing the maximum sentence,” said
Evan Mandery, an expert in capital
punishment at the John Jay College of
Criminal Justice. “On the face, it would seem
that would apply to a death-penalty case,” but
no specific ruling of the high court has found
the precedent invalidates the Florida system,
he said.
The Florida attorney general’s office
declined to comment beyond its legal brief.
In its brief opposing Mr. Hurst’s petition, the
state argued its sentencing procedures were
adequate. Trial rules “do provide jury input
about the existence of aggravating
circumstances that was lacking in the
Arizona procedures that the court struck
down in Ring,” the state said.
The Florida Supreme Court has suggested the
state legislature tighten requirements for
death sentences, including requiring
unanimous
jury
recommendations.
Bipartisan legislation to make those changes
is going before a state Senate committee on
Tuesday.
“The specter of having our sentencing
scheme invalidated is what motivates those
of us seeking to reform our laws—and those
odds just increased,” said state Rep. José
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Javier Rodriguez, a Miami Democrat who
introduced a sentencing bill in December.
A separate U.S. Supreme Court decision
from 2002 found it unconstitutional to
execute intellectually disabled defendants,
but gave the states leeway in complying with
the ruling. Last year, the justices found
Florida’s method—a rigid cutoff of a 70 IQ
score—insufficient, instead requiring that
those with scores in that range be allowed to
introduce additional evidence speaking to
their mental capacity.
Only Florida and Alabama permit death
sentences without a unanimous jury
recommendation—with Florida requiring a
simple majority and Alabama requiring at
least a 10-2 vote, Mr. Hurst’s petition said.

fourth highest number among the states, and
Alabama has executed 56, ranking sixth,
according to the Death Penalty Information
Center.
Alabama also permits judges to impose the
death
penalty
despite
a
jury’s
recommendation for a life sentence, a
practice the Supreme Court upheld in 1995.
Two years ago, the court declined an
opportunity to revisit the issue, over the
dissent of Justices Sonia Sotomayor and
Stephen Breyer. New petitions raising that
issue currently are pending before the court.
Florida and Delaware also permit a judge to
override a jury, but that hasn’t happened for
at least 15 years, Mr. Mandery said.
The Hurst case will be heard in the high
court’s next term, which begins in October.

Florida has executed 90 convicts since the
death penalty was reinstated in 1976, the
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“Florida’s Death Row Could See Vacancies if Supreme Court Rules
Juries Must be Unanimous”
The Florida Times Union
Larry Hannan
April 25, 2015
Very few people in Jacksonville have heard
of Timothy Hurst. But the Panhandle man
may soon be responsible for getting dozens
of people from the Jacksonville area off
Death Row.
The scenario could happen because of the
way Florida sentences convicted killers to
death. Hurst, 36 and on Death Row for killing
an Escambia County fast-food manager,
claims his death sentence violates the Sixth
Amendment because only seven of his 12
jurors recommended he get the death penalty.
The other five said he should get life without
the possibility of parole.
Florida, Delaware and Alabama are the only
states that don’t require juries in deathpenalty cases to reach a unanimous decision
when sentencing someone to death. In
Florida a jury must unanimously vote to
convict someone of first-degree murder and
then decides whether to recommend death
after a separate sentencing hearing.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to consider
Hurst’s case. Oral arguments are expected to
occur this year with a ruling likely in the
spring of 2016.
Jacksonville-area Public Defender Matt
Shirk said he believes in the death penalty,
but not the way Florida practices it. He hopes
the Supreme Court throws out Hurst’s death
sentence.

“In this state we’re just getting it wrong when
we don’t require a unanimous jury verdict,”
Shirk said.
Seventy-five people are on Death Row for
murders committed in Duval, Clay, Nassau,
Putnam or St. Johns counties. Only 13 got
sentenced to death after a jury unanimously
recommended it.
That means 62 people on Death Row from
Northeast Florida could have their death
sentences thrown out if the Supreme Court
rules in Hurst’s favor. People who could be
impacted include Rasheem Dubose,
convicted of the murder of 8-year-old
Dreshawna Davis; Paul Durousseau for the
murder of Tyresa Mack; and Alan Wade,
Tiffany Cole and Michael James Jackson for
the robbery, kidnapping and murders of Carol
and Reggie Sumner.
RING VS. ARIZONA
Ronald Clark, 47, knows Hurst very well.
Hurst lives down the hall from him on
Florida’s Death Row. There since 1991 for
the murder of Ronald Willis in Jacksonville,
Clark sees Hurst as perhaps his best chance
to die of natural causes. The jury that
convicted Clark recommended death on an
11-1 vote.
“I think this case is way overdue,” Clark said
in a letter to the Times-Union. “Florida, in
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ignoring the courts ruling in Ring vs. Arizona
basically was slapping the U.S. Supreme
Court in the face, saying it’s our way or the
highway, we run things down here in the dirty
South, not you do-gooders in Washington.”
Richard Dieter, executive director of the
Death Penalty Information Network, said
death-penalty opponents have been waiting a
long time for a case like Hurst’s. In fact
they’ve been waiting since 2002.
That was the year the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in Ring vs. Arizona that a jury — not a
judge — must make the factual findings
required to sentence someone to death.
The 7-2 majority opinion, written by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, said juries must find
beyond a reasonable doubt each factor
considered in determining whether a death
sentence should be imposed.
To involve jurors any less, she said, violated
defendants’ Sixth-Amendment right to a trial
by jury.
“We all took note of Ring when it was
decided,” said former Jacksonville Public
Defender Bill White. “It was obvious that
without a unanimous jury recommendation
there were going to be Sixth Amendment
issues in Florida.”
The ruling essentially invalidated Arizona’s
death-penalty law, which had trial judges
decide whether someone should be sentenced
to death with no jury feedback. Dieter said it
also should have invalidated Florida’s deathpenalty law because the court ruling required
the jury to decide if someone should be
sentenced to death.

“Florida does not allow for such a
determination,” Dieter said. “Instead, the jury
makes only an advisory recommendation to
the judge that aggravating factors exist [thus
indicating eligibility for the death penalty]
and that the person should be sentenced to life
or death.”
The factual determination of death-penalty
eligibility is left to the judge, not the jury, and
that violates the Sixth Amendment as
interpreted in Ring, Dieter said.
But in 2005 the Florida Supreme Court ruled
it did not violate the Constitution. However,
in his majority opinion upholding the law,
Supreme Court Justice Raoul Cantero called
on the Legislature to revisit Florida’s deathpenalty statute to require unanimity for jury
recommendations of death.
Nothing
happened.
Legislation
was
introduced multiple times, but it has never
come close to passing.
“The Legislature seems scared to do anything
that will make them seem soft on crime,”
White said.
Jacksonville lawyer Frank Tassone defended
death-penalty clients for decades at trials and
appeals. He thinks there’s a good chance the
Supreme Court rules in favor of Hurst.
“Common sense says that the Supreme Court
isn’t going to issue a ruling that lets
thousands of people out of prison,” Tassone
said. “But they may be willing to do this.”
No one would get out of prison; it would just
mean some people would get off Death Row
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and get sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole, he said.
The Hurst case is a strong appeal because the
jury recommended death on a 7-5 vote and he
had no previous criminal record, said
Gainesville-area Chief Assistant Public
Defender Al Chipperfield, who previously
defended death-penalty clients as an assistant
public defender in Jacksonville.
“It’s possible the Supreme Court has been
waiting for the right case,” Chipperfield said.
“And this is it.”
AN UNEXPECTED EMOTION
Even when his son’s killer got the death
penalty, Glen Mitchell was pretty certain he
would never be executed.
“I had done research and saw that other
murders much worse than what happened to
Jeff had been overturned,” Mitchell said. “So
even during the trial I thought the death
penalty wouldn’t hold up.”

When the Florida Supreme Court overturned
Jones’ death penalty in 1998 and ordered him
resentenced to life, Mitchell experienced an
emotion that he’d never expected to have.
“It seemed like Jeff’s life had just been
cheapened,” Mitchell said. “It wasn’t the
case, but even though I knew this was likely
to happen, that’s what it felt like.”
The feeling went away at the end of the day,
but it’s something Mitchell said he always
remembered because it was so unexpected.
While Mitchell will never experience that
feeling again, many other people may soon
deal with similar emotions.
Cecil King was convicted of beating 82-yearold Renie Telzer-Bain to death with a
hammer. The jury recommended death on an
8-4 vote.
Telzer-Bain’s daughter-in-law, Lysa Telzer,
said it was “unnerving” to think King may get
his death sentence thrown out.

Jeff Mitchell, then 14, was shot and killed
during a robbery attempt outside Terry
Parker High.

“The law was followed in putting him on
Death Row,” she said. “There was never any
doubt that he was guilty.”

Omar Shareef Jones, now 41, was convicted
of first-degree murder and originally
sentenced to death for shooting Mitchell as he
waited outside school for a ride home. Also
sentenced for first-degree murder was
Edward Jerome Goodman, 41, who received
life in prison. Two others involved in the
shooting were convicted of second-degree
murder.

To put her family and other families who lost
someone to violent crime through this isn’t
fair, and it isn’t justice, Telzer said.
If the Supreme Court rules in favor of Hurst,
it shouldn’t be retroactive, she said. Everyone
now on Death Row should remain and new
rules requiring a unanimous jury verdict of
death should only factor into future cases.
RETROACTIVE
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If the U.S. Supreme Court rules for Hurst, the
62 First Coast Death Row inmates who had
at least one juror recommend life will likely
all claim they should have their death-penalty
sentences thrown out. But Stephen Harper, a
Florida International University law
professor who previously worked as an
assistant public defender in Miami, believes
that most of them won’t be happy with what
happens next.
After Ring vs. Arizona was decided in 2002
the U.S. Supreme Court issued a follow-up
ruling in 2004 that said the Ring decision
couldn’t be applied retroactively. That means
anyone sentenced to death before 2002, such
as Clark, is probably out of luck.
But since 2002 every lawyer of someone
facing a potential Death Row sentence
always makes a motion to declare Florida’s
death-penalty rules unconstitutional, citing
the Ring case. The motion is always denied
by the trial judge, but on making that motion
the issue is preserved for an appeal.

Which, in layman’s terms, means that
everyone sentenced to death after 2002 has a
chance of getting off Death Row.
The Florida Department of Corrections lists
about 30 First Coast Death Row inmates who
have arrived on Death Row since 2002,
although a few of them were originally
sentenced before 2002 but had to be retried or
resentenced after that date.
Shirk said he hopes that if the Supreme Court
rules in favor of Hurst, the justices will
explain in detail what it means for other

people on Death Row in Florida. He said he
thinks prosecutors will be more reluctant to
seek the death penalty if a unanimous jury
recommendation of death is required.
“But I can’t say that will apply to our own
prosecutor,” Shirk said, referring to State
Attorney Angela Corey, who has put more
people on Death Row than any other
prosecutor in Florida since she took office in
2009.
THE EFFECT
State Attorney Senior Managing Director
Bernie de la Rionda, who has put more
people on Death Row than just about any
other prosecutor in Florida and spoke on
behalf of Corey to the Times-Union, said the
office would not change how the death
penalty is sought if the ruling goes through.
But de la Rionda expressed hope that justices
would recognize that the current system is
fair.
A jury has already made a unanimous finding
that a person is guilty of first-degree murder
before they decide whether someone
deserves death, and that’s the most important
finding a jury makes, he said.
“We believe the system as it is now works
and is accurate and fair,” he said.
De la Rionda also cited Ted Bundy, one of
the most notorious serial killers in Florida
history, as an example of why the death
penalty is fair even without a unanimous jury
verdict of death.
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Bundy was executed for the murder of 12year-old Kimberly Leach of Lake City, but he
might have killed up to 30 women. The
Orlando jury who convicted Bundy
recommended death on a 10-2 vote.
“I think the most anti-death penalty person
would struggle with keeping him alive,” de la
Rionda said.
But former Jacksonville State Attorney Harry
Shorstein said the Bundy argument has been
used for years, and it’s not really valid.
“If that jury had to be unanimous, I think it
would have been,” he said. “Those 10 jurors
would have gotten the other two to change
their votes.”
If that hadn’t happened, Bundy would have
ended up being executed for another murder,
Shorstein said.
While prosecutors argue that many majority
verdicts recommending death would become
unanimous verdicts if that was the
requirement, Chipperfield isn’t so sure.
When picking juries, defense lawyers always
seek assurances from potential jurors that
they will stick to what they believe even if
other jurors disagree with them, and most
jurors say they will do that.
“I know prosecutors say the other jurors
would wear the
holdouts down,”
Chipperfield said. “But in other states, all you
need is one juror opposed to death and you’ve
got a life sentence.”

with a grain of salt because some people vote
no because they know they’re outvoted and
don’t want a death sentence on their
conscience.
He remembers one death-penalty vote in a
case he tried that was either 10-2 or 11-1, and
afterward a juror came up to him and
apologized that it wasn’t unanimous.
“That juror said everyone wanted death, a
couple of them just didn’t want to vote for it,”
de la Rionda said. “I am convinced some
people vote for life even though they really
think a defendant deserves death.”
De la Rionda said it would be more difficult
if the Supreme Court requires a unanimous
jury to call for death. But he doesn’t think it
will reduce the number of people his office
puts on Death Row.
Juror selection will take more time and trials
might also take longer, but the results will
likely remain the same, he said.
De la Rionda also said if the Supreme Court
throws out the death-penalty convictions of
people in Jacksonville based on a jury not
being unanimous, his office has the option of
seeking another penalty phase with a new
jury that puts those people back on Death
Row.
“I think Ms. Corey would seek to put all of
them back on Death Row,” de la Rionda said.
His office hasn’t spoken to victims’ families
yet in detail about this, although de la Rionda
said a few have contacted them.

De la Rionda said a lot of the 9-3 or 10-2
recommendations of death should be taken
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“It’s too early to talk about this,” de la Rionda
said. “We don’t want to add to their stress.”
But the Hurst case already is making an
impact. Attorneys for Lance Eugene
Kirkpatrick, convicted this month for killing
38-year-old Kim Dorsey, asked Circuit Judge
Mark Hulsey to delay his death-penalty phase
until after the court rules on Hurst’s case.
“This court should strike the death notice and
move to protect Mr. Kirkpatrick from a trial
under a scheme which, as shown below, the
Supreme Court is virtually certain to find
unconstitutional,” said attorney Julie Schlax
in her motion. “To allow a death sentence in
these circumstances would waste scarce

judicial resources and, more important,
subject the defendant to constitutionally
infirm capital proceedings.”
Hulsey refused to delay the sentencing phase,
and the jury rejected prosecutors’ calls to
execute him and recommended life without
parole.
De la Rionda said at least one other deathpenalty case is getting the same motion, but
it’s not realistic to wait for the Supreme Court
to rule.
“We have to try these cases,” he said. “It gets
more difficult to prove your case the longer
you wait.
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“Talking About the Death Penalty, Court to Court”
The New York Times
Linda Greenhouse
August 20, 2015
The Connecticut Supreme Court could have
taken an easy route to finding the state’s
death
penalty
unconstitutional
in
the decision it issued last week. The State
Legislature repealed the death penalty in
2012, but it made the repeal prospective,
leaving 11 men on death row. The reason for
the prospective-only repeal was obvious to
all: Two of the death-row inmates, Joshua
Komisarjevsky and Steven Hayes, had
committed a horrific home-invasion triple
murder that shocked the state in 2007, and the
prospect of barring their execution was
unpalatable to Connecticut politicians and
many members of the public.
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the
State Supreme Court might simply have
found the distinction between those who
committed murder before and after the repeal
date of April 25, 2012, to be arbitrary — a
violation of due process, equal protection or
both. Taking the repeal law, signed by Gov.
Dannel P. Malloy, to embody the collective
judgment of the people’s elected
representatives that capital punishment is no
longer an appropriate tool of criminal justice
in Connecticut, on what basis could the state
apply the death penalty to one class of
murderers and spare another, with the two
groups separated only by the date of offense?
The 92-page majority opinion in Connecticut
v. Santiago, written by Justice Richard N.
Palmer for four of the court’s seven justices,
was much more ambitious than that,

however, and in its ambition lies its
significance.
On hearing that the Connecticut Supreme
Court had invalidated the state’s death
penalty, many people probably shrugged and
thought, “O.K., that’s one little blue state that
hardly ever executed anyone (a single
execution in the past 55 years, if you’re
counting) and that was already never going to
add anyone new to death row. How important
can this decision be?”
That was, frankly, my thought as well, and I
picked up the decision — more than 200
pages, including concurring and dissenting
opinions — with some reluctance and a sense
of obligation. (My apartment building is
across the street from the New Haven
courthouse where crowds, gathered for the
consecutive trials in the home-invasion
murders, blocked the sidewalks for weeks in
2010 and 2011.) But I turned the pages with
mounting excitement. In the breadth of its
perspective on the history and current
problematic state of the death penalty, in its
cleareyed dissection of the irreconcilable
conflict at the heart of modern death-penalty
jurisprudence, the Connecticut Supreme
Court not only produced an important
decision for its own jurisdiction; but it
addressed the United States Supreme Court
frankly and directly. The decision engages
the Supreme Court at a crucial moment of
mounting unease, within the court and
outside it, with the death penalty’s trajectory
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over the nearly four decades since the court
permitted states to resume executions.
Next year marks the 40th anniversary
of Gregg v. Georgia and the four other
Supreme Court decisions that reviewed the
new generation of laws the states enacted in
an effort to comply with the 1972 decision
that had invalidated all existing death-penalty
laws. “These death sentences are cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual,” Justice Potter
Stewart famously wrote in a concurring
opinion in the 1972 case Furman v. Georgia.
The new laws that the Supreme Court upheld
were supposed to avoid just such
arbitrariness by limiting those defendants
deemed eligible for the death penalty and by
channeling juries’ discretion over when to
impose it.
The problem, as the Connecticut Supreme
Court demonstrates, is that it hasn’t worked.
Of some 200 cases in the state that might
have been charged as capital murder between
1973 and 2007, prosecutors sought the death
penalty in some 130 and obtained death
sentences in 12. “The selection of which
offenders live and which offenders die
appears to be inescapably tainted by caprice
and bias,” the court said, pointing to “an
inherent conflict in the requirements that the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court, imposes on
any capital sentencing scheme.”
On the one hand, the death penalty can’t be
automatic, but has to result from specific
findings about the crime and the defendant
through a process that relies on specifically

identified “aggravating factors.” That’s the
effort to channel discretion and treat like
cases alike. On the other hand, the jury must
have absolute discretion to consider any
“mitigating factors” that it deems relevant.
That’s the effort to treat each defendant as an
individual. The United States Supreme Court
deems both efforts as constitutionally
essential. But to quote from the Connecticut
opinion:
“The question is whether this individualized
sentencing requirement inevitably allows in
through the back door the same sorts of
caprice and freakishness that the court sought
to exclude in Furman, or, worse, whether
individualized sentencing necessarily opens
the door to racial and ethnic discrimination in
capital sentencing. In other words, is it ever
possible to eliminate arbitrary and
discriminatory application of capital
punishment through a more precise and
restrictive definition of capital crimes if
prosecutors always remain free not to seek
the death penalty for a particular defendant,
and juries not to impose it, for any reason
whatsoever? We do not believe that it is.”
Six weeks earlier, Justices Stephen G. Breyer
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting from
the decision that rejected a challenge to
Oklahoma’s
lethal-injection
protocol,
identified another inherent contradiction.
Deploring lengthy delays that “both
aggravate the cruelty of the death penalty and
undermine its jurisprudential rationale” (the
average delay between sentencing and
execution is now more than 17 years, they
noted), the justices said that the “special need
for reliability and fairness in capital cases”
means that substantial delay is inevitable.
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Justice Breyer, who wrote the 42-page
dissenting opinion that Justice Ginsburg
joined, said this: “In this world, or at least in
this nation, we can have a death penalty that
at least arguably serves legitimate
penological purposes or we can have a
procedural system that at least arguably seeks
reliability and fairness in the death penalty’s
application. We cannot have both.”
The two justices didn’t flatly declare a belief
that the death penalty is unconstitutional,
saying rather that it was “highly likely” to
violate the Eighth Amendment; the court,
they said, should invite full briefing on that
question “rather than try to patch up the death
penalty’s legal wounds one at a time.”
Like the Connecticut justices, these two
justices went beyond the confines of the case
before them to confront the deeper questions.
(Along with Justice Elena Kagan, Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg also signed Justice
Sonia Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion, which
more
conventionally
addressed
the
majority’s holding on lethal injection.) The
Connecticut decision and the BreyerGinsburg dissent were meant for wider
audiences, and to a notable degree, each
found an audience in the other. The
Connecticut justices cited Justice Breyer’s
dissent. I have no idea whether Justice Breyer
knew about the Connecticut case, which had
been pending for more than two years by the
time the United States Supreme Court issued
its lethal injection decision, Glossip v. Gross,
on June 29. (I found no mention of the
Connecticut case in the briefs the court
received.) But Justice Breyer did cite the
same statistical evidence in the same study of
the Connecticut death penalty that the

Connecticut justices used, concluding that
“such studies indicate that the factors that
most clearly ought to affect application of the
death penalty — namely, comparative
egregiousness of the crime — often do not.”
Were the Connecticut justices emboldened
by Justice Breyer’s invitation to grapple with
the death penalty itself? Maybe they were;
coming late in what by all signs was a
brutally contentious process within the
Connecticut Supreme Court, the Breyer
dissent must have appeared to the majority
justices as a gift from on high, an open door.
And clearly Justices Breyer and Ginsburg
mean to spur hard thinking about the death
penalty by every judge in the country.
And what about the Supreme Court itself?
The last member of the court to renounce the
death penalty was Justice John Paul Stevens,
who retired in 2010. In the ensuing five years
of silence, executions plummeted to a 20year low (35 last year, compared with a high
of 98 in 1999) and public approval of the
death penalty, at 56 percent earlier this year,
was the lowest in 40 years. Seven states
carried out executions last year, compared
with 20 in 1999. It’s no exaggeration to say
that there is a widespread de facto
moratorium in place, even in most of the
31 states that still have the death penalty on
their books. (In four of those states —
Washington,
Oregon,
Colorado and
Pennsylvania — governors have imposed an
actual moratorium.)
Although a Supreme Court decision
abolishing the death penalty wouldn’t shock
much of the country, it’s not easy to imagine
the John G. Roberts Jr. court taking that step.
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If the question, as it is so often, is “what
would Justice Kennedy do?” it’s worth
noting that he signed neither of the dissenting
opinions in the lethal injection case. He
silently joined the majority opinion of Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr. — the justice who during
the oral argument, in one of the uglier
performances that I can recall on the Supreme
Court bench, asked the lawyer for the
Oklahoma death-row inmates whether it was
“appropriate for the judiciary to countenance
what amounts to a guerrilla war against the
death penalty.” On the other hand, Justice
Kennedy has become an outspoken advocate

for reform of the criminal justice system,
with a recent focus on solitary confinement.
I’m not counting the days, or the Supreme
Court terms, until the court declares the death
penalty unconstitutional. But from two
courts, the highest in the land and the highest
court of one of the smallest states, a fruitful
conversation emerged this summer that will
inevitably spread, gain momentum and, in the
foreseeable if not immediate future, lead the
Supreme Court to take the step that I think a
majority of today’s justices know is the right
one.
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“Death Penalty in Fast-Food Slaying”
Pensacola News Journal
August 16, 2012
A judge this morning sentenced a Pensacola
man who brutally murdered his boss at a
restaurant during a robbery in 1998 to death.
Timothy Hurst, 32, was convicted in April
2000 of first-degree murder in the killing of
28-year-old Cynthia Harrison. Harrison was
Hurst's manager when he worked at the
Popeye's on Nine Mile Road. Her body was
found in the restaurant's freezer.
Her hands and mouth were wrapped with
electrical tape, authorities said at the time,
and her body had been slashed more than 60
times with a box cutter.
Circuit Judge Linda Nobles read the order
sentencing Hurst during a hearing that lasted
about 30 minutes at the M.C. Blanchard
Judicial Building in Pensacola.
Hurst, who was in the courtroom dressed in a
green and white jumpsuit, did not react after
she read her decision.
This is the second time Hurst has been
sentenced to death.

In 2000, a jury decided 11-1 that he deserved
the death penalty.
Former Circuit Judge Joseph Tarbuck
initially sentenced him to death for what he
called an "especially heinous, atrocious and
cruel" crime, explaining that Hurst murdered
Harrison in an attempt to cover his tracks for
robbing the restaurant.
However, that sentence was overturned by
the Florida Supreme Court in 2009 because
certain pieces of evidence, including those
that established Hurst's mental capacity, were
not shown to the jury during the penalty
phase, said Assistant State Attorney John
Molchan.
A new penalty phase was held over several
days last year, and the jury decided 7-5 to
recommend the death penalty. While the
jury's recommendation is given consideration
for Hurst's sentence, his fate ultimately lies in
Nobles' hands.
Molchan said the defendant's attorney
presented evidence showing that Hurst had a
lower mental capacity during last year's
penalty phase.
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Kansas v. Carr
14-449 (consolidated with Kansas v. Carr, 14-450)
Ruling Below: State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 340 (Kan. 2014)
Defendant Jonathan D. Carr, and his brother, Reginald Dexter Carr, Jr., were jointly charged,
tried, convicted, and sentenced for crimes committed in a series of incidents in December 2000
in Wichita.
The Kansas Supreme Court determined that (a) the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant
of felony murder because his possession of the murder weapon was clear in that he had it in his
possession minutes after the shooting, and he thoroughly cleaned both the gun and the bullets it
held; defendant's conviction did not require inference to be stacked upon inference; (b) The trial
court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial based on comments made by the codefendant's
counsel during opening statements; at the time counsel wrapped up his opening statement, the
jury was immediately told that his remarks were "improper;" and (c) The trial judge's failure to
sever the penalty phase of defendant and the codefendant's trial violated defendant's U.S. Const.
amend. VIII right to an individualized sentencing determination and could not be deemed
harmless error. (Credit Lexis Nexis)
Question Presented: Whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital-sentencing jury be
affirmatively instructed that mitigating circumstances “need not be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt,” as the Kansas Supreme Court held here, or instead whether the Eighth Amendment is
satisfied by instructions that, in context, make clear that each juror must individually assess and
weigh any mitigating circumstances; and whether the trial court's decision not to sever the
sentencing phase of the co-defendant brothers’ trial here – a decision that comports with the
traditional approach preferring joinder in circumstances like this – violated an Eighth
Amendment right to an “individualized sentencing” determination and was not harmless in any
event.

State of KANSAS
Appellee
v.
Jonathan D. CARR
Appellant
Supreme Court of Kansas
July 25, 2014, Opinion Filed
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
PER CURIUM:
This is J. Carr's direct appeal from his 43
convictions and four death sentences.
Our opinion in codefendant R. Carr's direct
appeal also is filed today. With the exception
of the brief introduction to follow, this
opinion will refer to the opinion in R. Carr's
appeal as much as possible, rather than repeat
facts, procedural history, or legal discussions
and resolutions.
The first incident giving rise to the charges in
this case occurred on December 7 and 8.
Andrew Schreiber was the victim. The State
charged J. Carr and R. Carr with one count of
kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery,
one count of aggravated battery, and one
count of criminal damage to property. The
jury acquitted J. Carr on all counts and
convicted R. Carr on all counts.
In the second incident on December 11,
Linda Ann Walenta was the victim. The State
charged J. Carr and R. Carr with one count of
first-degree felony murder. The jury
convicted both men.
In the third incident on December 14 and 15,
Heather M., Aaron S., Brad H., Jason B., and
Holly G. were the victims of an invasion at
the men's Birchwood Drive home that led to
sex crimes, kidnappings, robberies, and,
eventually, murder and attempted murder.
The State charged J. Carr and R. Carr with
eight alternative counts of capital murder,
four based on a related sex crime under
K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(4) and four based on

multiple first-degree premeditated murders
under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6); one count of
attempted first-degree murder; five counts of
aggravated kidnapping; nine counts of
aggravated robbery, eight of which were
alternatives, four based on use of a dangerous
weapon and four based on infliction of bodily
harm; one count of aggravated burglary; 13
counts of rape, eight of which were based on
coerced victim-on-victim sexual intercourse
and one of which was based on a victim's
coerced self-penetration; three counts of
aggravated criminal sodomy, two of which
were based on coerced victim-on-victim oral
sex; seven counts of attempted rape, six of
which were based on coerced victim-onvictim overt acts toward the perpetration of
rape; one count of burglary; and one count of
theft. The State also charged J. Carr and R.
Carr with one count of cruelty to animals
because of the killing of Holly G.'s dog. The
jury convicted J. Carr and R. Carr on all of
the charges arising out of the Birchwood
incident.
In connection with the three incidents, the
State also charged R. Carr alone with three
counts of unlawful possession of a firearm.
The jury convicted him on these three counts
as well.
After J. Carr's acquittal on the Schreiber
incident and the defendants' convictions on
all other charges, in a separate capital penalty
proceeding, J. Carr and R. Carr were
sentenced to death for each of the four capital
murders committed on December 15. They
each received a hard 20 life sentence for the
Walenta felony murder. J. Carr received a
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controlling
total
of
492
months'
imprisonment consecutive to the hard 20 life
sentence, and R. Carr received a controlling
total of 570 months' imprisonment
consecutive to the hard 20 life sentence for
the
remaining
non-death-eligible
convictions.

convictions for capital murder because of
charging and multiplicity errors. We also
reverse his convictions on Counts 25, 26, 29
through 40, and 42 for coerced sex acts for
similar reasons. We affirm the convictions
based on Counts 2, 9 through 24, 27, 28, 41,
and 43 through 55.

In his briefs, J. Carr raises 21 issues tied to
the guilt phase of his prosecution and 16
issues tied to the death penalty phase of his
prosecution. In addition, because this is a
death penalty case, this court is empowered
to notice and discuss unassigned potential
errors under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6619(b),
which we do. J. Carr does not challenge the
sentences he received for the Walenta felony
murder; for the crimes in which Heather M.,
Aaron S., Brad H., Jason B., and Holly G.
were the victims that were not eligible for the
death penalty; or for the cruelty to animals
conviction.

We vacate J. Carr's death sentence for the
remaining capital murder conviction, because
the district judge refused to sever the
defendants' penalty phase trials. We remand
to the district court for further proceedings.

Both sides sought many extensions of time to
file briefs in this appeal and in R. Carr's
separate appeal. In J. Carr's case, all of these
extension requests were unopposed by the
other side of the case. After completion of
briefing, this court heard oral argument on
December 17, 2013.
After searching review of the record, careful
examination of the parties' arguments,
extensive independent legal research, and
lengthy deliberations, we affirm 25 of J.
Carr's 43 convictions, including those for one
count of capital murder of Heather M.,
Aaron S., Brad H., and Jason B. under K.S.A.
21-3439(a)(6) and for the felony murder of
Walenta. We reverse the three remaining

FACTUAL
AND
PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND FOR GUILT PHASE
ISSUES
The general factual and procedural
background for the guilt phase issues in this
case is set out in full in the R. Carr opinion.
We need not repeat it or supplement it here.
To the extent additional, issue-specific
factual or procedural background is
necessary to resolve any legal issue unique to
J. Carr, it will be included in the discussion
sections below.
GUILT PHASE ISSUES AND SHORT
ANSWERS
We begin our discussion by setting out the
questions we answer today on the guilt phase
of J. Carr's trial. We have taken the liberty of
reformulating certain questions to focus on
their legally significant aspects or effects. We
also have reordered questions raised by the
defense and have inserted among them
unassigned potential errors noted by us,
because we believe this organization
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enhances clarity. We number the questions
disposed of by our opinion in R. Carr's appeal
1 through 21, despite occasional intervening
subheadings. We do not repeat our full
discussion of these questions in this opinion;
rather, we include only their short answers
and references to the appropriate sections of
the R. Carr opinion that control the resolution
of the similar issues raised or noticed in this
appeal. We number the four additional
questions not disposed of by our opinion in
R. Carr's appeal J1 through J4. Our short
answer to each question follows the question.
We then discuss these four questions fully in
individual sections of this opinion.
Issues Disposed of by Opinion in R. Carr
Appeal
Issues Affecting All Incidents
1. Did the district judge err in refusing to
grant defense motions for change of venue?
A majority of six of the court's members
answers this question no for reasons
explained in Section 1 of the R. Carr opinion,
while one member of the court dissents and
writes separately on this issue and its
reversibility, standing alone.
2. Did the district judge err in refusing to
sever the guilt phase of defendants' trial? A
majority of six members of the court answers
this question yes for reasons explained in
Section 2 of the R. Carr opinion, while one
member of the court dissents and writes
separately on this issue. A majority of four
members of the court agrees that any error on
this issue was not reversible standing alone
for reasons explained in the R. Carr appeal,

while three members of the court dissent, and
one of them writes separately for the three on
the reversibility question.
3. Was it error for the State to pursue
conviction of J. Carr for all counts arising out
of the three December 2000 incidents in one
prosecution? The court unanimously answers
this question no for reasons explained in
Section 3 of the R. Carr opinion.
4. Did the district judge err (a) by excusing
prospective juror M.W., who opposed the
death penalty, for cause, (b) by failing to
excuse allegedly mitigation-impaired jury
panel members W.B., D.R., D.Ge., and H.Gu.
for cause, or (c) by excusing prospective
jurors K.J., M.G., H.D., C.R., D.H., and
M.B., who expressed moral or religious
reservations about the death penalty, for
cause? The court unanimously agrees there
was no error on any of these bases for reasons
explained in Section 4 of the R. Carr opinion.
5. Did the district judge err by rejecting a
defense challenge under Batson v. Kentucky,
to the State's peremptory strike of juror and
eventual foreperson W.B.? The court
unanimously answers this question yes for
reasons explained in Section 5 of the R. Carr
opinion. A majority of four members of the
court agrees that any error on this issue was
not reversible standing alone for reasons
explained in Section 5 of the R. Carr opinion,
while three members of the court dissent, and
one of them writes separately for the three on
the reversibility question.
Issue Specific to Walenta Incident
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6. Was the district judge's admission of
statements by Walenta through law
enforcement error under the Sixth
Amendment and Crawford v. Washington?
The court unanimously answers this question
yes for reasons explained in Section 6 of the
R. Carr opinion, but the court also
unanimously agrees that this error was not
reversible standing alone.
Issues Specific to Quadruple Homicide and
Other Birchwood Crimes
7. Did faulty jury instructions on all four
K.S.A.
21-3439(a)(4)
sex-crime-based
capital murders and a multiplicity problem on
three of four K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6) multipledeath capital murders combine to require
reversal of three of J. Carr's death-eligible
convictions? The court unanimously answers
this question yes for reasons explained in
Section 9 of the R. Carr opinion.
8. Was a special unanimity instruction
required for Counts 1, 3, 5, and 7 because of
multiple sex crimes underlying each count?
The court declines to reach the merits of this
issue for reasons explained in Section 10 of
the R. Carr opinion.

explained in Section 12 of the R. Carr
opinion.
11. Did the State fail to correctly charge and
the district judge fail to correctly instruct on
coerced victim-on-victim rape and attempted
rape, as those crimes are defined by Kansas
statutes, rendering J. Carr's convictions on
those offenses void for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction? The court unanimously answers
this question yes for reasons explained in
Section 13 of the R. Carr opinion.
12. Was the State's evidence of J. Carr's guilt
as a principal on Count 41 for Holly G.'s
digital self-penetration sufficient? A majority
of four of the court's members answers this
question yes for reasons explained in Section
14 of the R. Carr opinion, while three
members of the court dissent, and one of
them writes separately for the two of them on
this issue and its reversibility.
13. Were Count 41 and Count 42
multiplicitous? The court unanimously
answers this question yes and reverses J.
Carr's conviction as a principal on Count 42
for reasons explained in Section 15 of the R.
Carr opinion.

9. Must sex crime convictions underlying
capital murder Counts 1, 3, 5, and 7 be
reversed because they were lesser included
offenses of capital murder under K.S.A. 213439 (a)(4)? The court declines to reach the
merits of this issue for reasons explained in
Section 11 of the R. Carr opinion.

14. Was evidence of results from
mitochondrial DNA testing of hairs found at
the Birchwood home erroneously admitted?
The court unanimously answers this question
no for reasons explained in Section 19 of the
R. Carr opinion.

10. Was the State's evidence of aggravated
burglary sufficient? The court unanimously
answers this question yes for reasons

15. Did the district judge err by failing to
instruct on felony murder as a lesser included
crime of capital murder? The court
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unanimously answers this question no for
reasons explained in Section 21 of the R. Carr
opinion.
Other Evidentiary Issues
16. Did the district judge err by automatically
excluding eyewitness identification expert
testimony proffered by the defense? The
court unanimously answers this question yes
for reasons explained in Section 22 of the R.
Carr opinion, but the court also unanimously
agrees that any error on this issue was not
reversible standing alone.
17. Did the district judge err by permitting a
jury view of locations referenced in evidence,
in violation of the defendants' right to be
present, right to assistance of counsel, and
right to a public trial? The court unanimously
answers this question no for reasons
explained in Section 23 of the R. Carr
opinion.
Other Instructional Issues
18. Did the district judge err by failing to
include language in the instruction on
reliability of eyewitness identifications to
ensure that jurors considered possible
infirmities in cross-racial identifications?
The court unanimously answers this question
no for reasons explained in Section 24 of the
R. Carr opinion.
19. Was the instruction on aiding and
abetting erroneous because (a) it permitted
jurors to convict the defendants as aiders and
abettors for reasonably foreseeable crimes of
the other, regardless of whether the State
proved the aider and abettor's premeditation,

(b) it failed to communicate that the
defendant aider and abettor had to possess the
premeditated intent to kill in order to be
convicted of capital murder, or (c) it omitted
language from K.S.A. 21-3205(2)? The court
unanimously answers the first question yes
for reasons explained in Section 25 of the R.
Carr opinion. The court unanimously
answers the second question no for reasons
explained in Section 25 of the R. Carr
opinion. The court unanimously answers the
third question no for reasons explained in
Section 25 of the R. Carr opinion. The court
unanimously agrees that the error on the first
question was not reversible standing alone
for reasons explained in Section 25 of the R.
Carr opinion.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
20. Did one of the prosecutors commit
reversible misconduct by telling jurors to
place themselves in the position of the
victims? The court unanimously answers this
question no for reasons explained in Section
26 of the R. Carr opinion.
Cumulative Error
21. Did cumulative error deny J. Carr a fair
trial on his guilt? A majority of four of the
court's members answers this question no for
reasons explained in Section 27 of the R. Carr
opinion, while three members of the court
dissent, and one of them writes separately for
them on this issue.
Issues Not Disposed of by Opinion in R.
Carr Appeal
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J1. Did the district judge err by refusing to
grant a mistrial when the opening statement
by R. Carr's counsel implicated J. Carr and
another unknown man as the perpetrators of
the Birchwood crimes? A majority of four of
the court's members answers this question no.
Three members of the court would hold this
to be error and include it among those
considered under the cumulative error
doctrine.
J2. Did admission of Walenta's statements
violate J. Carr's confrontation rights under
Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of
Rights? The court declines to reach the merits
of the Section 10 argument.
J3. Did J. Carr's conviction on the Walenta
felony murder depend upon impermissible
inference stacking, meaning the State's
evidence was insufficient? A majority of six
members of the court answers this question
no. One member of the court dissents and
writes separately on this issue and its
reversibility, standing alone.
J4. Was the State's evidence of J. Carr's guilt
as an aider and abettor of R. Carr's rape and
aggravated criminal sodomy of Holly G.
sufficient? The court unanimously answers
this question yes.
J1. REFUSAL TO GRANT MISTRIAL
AFTER OPENING STATEMENTS
This court rules today in the R. Carr appeal
that District Judge Paul Clark erred by
refusing to sever the defendants' guilt phase
trials but that the error does not require

reversal standing alone. These holdings apply
equally to this appeal on behalf of J. Carr.
J. Carr has argued additional reasons peculiar
to him why severance was required—that a
joint trial limited his ability to introduce
certain hearsay testimony through Tronda
Adams, that it allowed R. Carr to act as a
second prosecutor by introducing testimony
from Stephanie Donley and a statement from
Holly G. that were inculpatory of J. Carr, and
that it permitted the jury to observe and be
prejudiced by R. Carr's improper courtroom
behavior. But these reasons, if meritorious,
would only add weight to our holding that the
failure to sever was error. They would not
persuade us that reversal of all of J. Carr's
convictions is required as a result of that
error.
We mention the severance issue in this
context because it is distinct from but related
to the unique challenge J. Carr makes on this
appeal to Judge Clark's refusal to grant him a
mistrial after opening statements.
R. Carr's counsel told the jury during opening
statement that his client merely stored
property stolen from the Birchwood victims
for J. Carr and another unknown, uncharged
third man, suggesting that J. Carr and the
third man were responsible for all of the
charged Birchwood crimes. These remarks
prompted an objection from counsel for J.
Carr on the grounds that they were
argumentative and unsupported by the
evidence. Judge Clark overruled the
objection.
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This ruling by Judge Clark was correct.
Counsel for R. Carr began his explanation of
what happened on the night of December 14
and 15, 2000, with the phrase "the evidence
will show." That phrase signals the purpose
of opening statement; it provides an
opportunity for counsel to outline a version
of events that he or she expects the evidence
to prove to the jury. In addition, the objection
by J. Carr's counsel that the opening
statement was unsupported by evidence was
virtually impossible to sustain at that stage of
the case, when all evidence was yet to be
admitted.
R. Carr's counsel continued to discuss the
involvement of J. Carr and the third unknown
man in the Birchwood crimes, finally
observing that "the Birchwood address is
replete with Jonathan Carr's DNA . . . .
Ultimately, the DNA evidence will show that
Jonathan Carr, not Reginald Carr, Jonathan
Carr committed most, if not all of the crimes
which are alleged in the complaint and that
he did it with a third black male who still
walks the streets of Wichita."
At this point the State objected, and Judge
Clark sustained the objection, saying, "It's an
improper comment."
During that day's lunch break, outside the
presence of the jury, the State argued that the
opening statement by counsel for R. Carr had
violated rulings on motions in limine and that
he should be sanctioned for misconduct. The
prosecutor also asked the judge to instruct the
jury to disregard the statement. J. Carr moved
for a mistrial. The grounds his counsel
advanced in support of the motion, although

abbreviated, were exactly the same as those
advanced in support of J. Carr's multiple
motions for severance: The defenses of J.
Carr and R. Carr were mutually and
irreconcilably antagonistic.
When examining an appellate claim arising
out of denial of a mistrial, we review the
district judge's decision for an abuse of
discretion. We first ask whether the district
judge abused his or her discretion when
deciding whether there was a fundamental
failure in the proceedings. If so, we then
examine whether the district judge abused his
or her discretion when deciding whether the
problematic conduct resulted in prejudice
that could not be cured or mitigated through
jury admonition or instruction, resulting in an
injustice.
Having already held that defense motions for
severance of the guilt phase should have been
granted, we also hold that Judge Clark abused
his discretion by failing to recognize a
fundamental failure in the proceedings when
R. Carr's counsel made his remarks during
opening statement. Those remarks made the
irreconcilable
antagonism
of
the
codefendants' cases inescapably clear.
However, also in line with the majority view
on severance, we further hold that there was
no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant a
mistrial to cure that failure.
At the time R. Carr's counsel wrapped up his
opening statement, the jury was immediately
told that his remarks were "improper." No
evidence to support the third-party theory of
the case was ever introduced. And,
ultimately, the jury received the usual
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instruction that statements of counsel are not
evidence. Under these circumstances, we do
not discern enough additional damage to J.
Carr's case attributable to the opening
statement by R. Carr's counsel—i.e., any
damage beyond that J. Carr's case already
was bound to suffer because of the denial of
severance—to persuade us that all of his
convictions must be reversed.
J2.
CONFRONTATION
RIGHTS
UNDER SECTION 10 OF KANSAS
CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS
Like R. Carr, J. Carr challenges the
admission of Walenta's statements under the
Sixth Amendment and the Confrontation
Clause. We have fully discussed those
arguments in Section 6 of the R. Carr opinion
and need not revisit them here. J. Carr also
invoked Section 10 of the Kansas
Constitution Bill of Rights in support of his
position on this issue, and it is that invocation
that prompts us to make a brief response in
this opinion.
We have not previously differentiated the
rights of a defendant protected by the Sixth
Amendment and those protected by Section
10. And we need not do so here. We leave the
merits of any argument under Section 10 to
the next case.
J3. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE ON
WALENTA FELONY MURDER
J. Carr challenges the evidence supporting his
conviction of Walenta's felony murder as
insufficient, arguing that impermissible

inference stacking was required in order for
the jury to convict.
Additional Factual
Background

and

Procedural

Count 51 in the amended complaint charged
both defendants with first-degree felony
murder of Walenta while committing or
attempting to commit the inherently
dangerous felony of aggravated robbery.
Summarized for ease of reference, the
evidence showed Walenta was approached
by a black male shortly after she pulled into
her driveway about 9:40 p.m. on the evening
of December 11, 2000. Walenta saw the man
get out of a light-colored four-door car that
had followed her and then parked near her
house. The man indicated in some way that
he needed assistance, and Walenta rolled
down her driver's-side window a few inches
to talk to him. As soon as she did so, the man
stuck a black handgun into the car, holding it
palm down and pointing it at her head. When
she attempted to put her Yukon in reverse to
get away, the man shot her three times. He
then ran away and the light-colored car pulled
away. Walenta said she was not sure whether
the gunman had been left behind by whoever
was driving the light-colored car.
Later on the evening of December 11, about
11:15, J. Carr showed up at Adams' house.
Adams testified in pertinent part:
"Q. Do you remember what he was
driving?
"A. I think he was dropped off that
night and his brother came back to
pick him up.
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"Q. And so you are not sure of the
vehicle?
"A. The Camry, it would have been
the [light-colored four-door] Camry.
"Q. Okay. So when his brother
returned, did you see him to the door?
"A. No, I don't think so.
"Q. Do you recall whether you saw
the Camry the early morning hours of
the 12th?
"A. No, I don't, no."
Adams also testified that J. Carr had a black
handgun with him on the same night, which
he left with her. Late the next day he asked
her to return the gun to him, scolded her for
touching it too much, and then proceeded to
clean it and every bullet in it thoroughly.
Adams identified the black Lorcin at trial as
the gun J. Carr had with him on the night of
December 11, 2000.
A few days later, after J. Carr and R. Carr had
been arrested in the wake of the Birchwood
crimes, Walenta picked two pictures out of a
photo array as representative of the general
appearance of the man who had shot her. One
of those pictures was of R. Carr. She also said
that the eyes of the man in the photo of R.
Carr represented what she remembered of the
gunman's eyes. She did not see anyone else at
the scene of the shooting and was not able to
pick any photo from an array containing a
photo of J. Carr.
Ballistics expert testimony established that
the black handgun used in the shooting of
Walenta was the same black Lorcin .380 used
to shoot out Schreiber's tire and to murder the
four friends from the Birchwood home.

J. Carr was acquitted on the four charges
arising out of the Schreiber incident and
convicted on all charges against him arising
out of the Walenta and Birchwood incidents.
Evidence Sufficiency
Our standard of review on sufficiency claims
is often stated and familiar:
"When the sufficiency of the
evidence is challenged in a criminal
case, the standard of review is
whether, after review of all the
evidence, examined in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, the
appellate court is convinced a rational
factfinder could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. While the State must sustain its
burden of proof on each element of an
offense charged, circumstantial
evidence and the logical inferences
therefrom are sufficient to support a
conviction of even the most serious
crime. If an appellate court holds that
evidence to support a conviction is
insufficient as a matter of law, the
conviction must be reversed; and no
retrial on the same crime is possible.”
In addition, appellate courts do not reweigh
evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or
make witness credibility determinations.
We do not agree with J. Carr that his
conviction of Walenta's felony murder
required inference to be stacked upon
inference.
Walenta saw the gunman emerge from the
passenger seat of the light-colored car, and
she saw the car pull away from its parking
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place immediately after the shooting. A juror
need only make one inference from these
facts to arrive at a finding that there was
another person driving the car that followed
her. Adams testified that J. Carr was with his
brother on the night of the crime. Adams'
testimony on whether she ever saw J. Carr in
the company of R. Carr on the night of
December 11 is ambiguous; she may have
seen them together, but she may not have.
Regardless, she had many ways of knowing
they had been together. Her testimony on that
point was not ambiguous or unclear, and it
placed J. Carr with R. Carr not long after
Walenta was shot. This testimony did not
require the jury to draw an inference at all.
Adams' testimony on the car J. Carr and R.
Carr would have been using was equally
clear. The phrasing of the questions put to her
gave her every opportunity to say that she
was unsure; she did not. This testimony,
again, did not require any inference to be
stacked on any other inference. Finally, J.
Carr's possession of the black gun later
identified as the Walenta murder weapon also
was clear. He had it in his possession on
December 11, 90 minutes after Walenta's
shooting; he gave it to Adams; he took it back
from her on December 12; he was unhappy
that she had been handling it, and he cleaned
it and the bullets it held—remarkably
thoroughly. These were direct observations
of Adams. No inference of any kind was
required.
What was required was the jury's willingness
to be persuaded of J. Carr's guilt on
circumstantial evidence. This is expressly
allowed under Kansas law. Circumstantial
proof is still proof. It is not equivalent to

impermissible inference-stacking. It can rise
to the level of beyond a reasonable doubt.
Particularly when we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution,
we conclude the evidence in this case was
sufficient to convict J. Carr of Walenta's
murder. This conclusion is reinforced by our
recent decision in State v. McBroom in which
we held that evidence of the defendant's
participation in a string of burglaries with a
friend could be relied upon by a jury to find
he also participated in a burglary/homicide
that was apparently committed by more than
one person in the same general area and time
frame. In this case, the evidence against J.
Carr on the Birchwood incident would
naturally have reinforced the evidence on the
Walenta incident.
J4. ACCOMPLICE CULPABILITY FOR
CODEFENDANT'S SEX CRIMES
J. Carr also challenges his conviction as an
aider and abettor of R. Carr's rape and
aggravated criminal sodomy of Holly G.
We fully discussed the mirror image of this
challenge in our opinion on the R. Carr
appeal, in Section 16. There we ruled that R.
Carr could be found guilty as an aider and
abettor of J. Carr's sex crimes against Holly
G. and Heather M., even though R. Carr was
out of the Birchwood home on a trip with a
victim to one or more ATMs or in another
room when the crimes occurred. The all-night
joint enterprise of the Birchwood intruders
was plainly and repeatedly demonstrated by
the State's evidence, particularly Holly G.'s
lengthy and detailed testimony. Under the
standard of review recited in the previous
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section of this opinion, we have no hesitation
in holding that the evidence J. Carr aided and
abetted R. Carr's rape and aggravated
criminal sodomy of Holly G. was sufficient.
CONCLUSION FOR GUILT PHASE
For the reasons set forth above and in the
opinion filed today in R. Carr's appeal, we
affirm J. Carr's capital murder conviction
under Count 2. We reverse his three
remaining capital murder convictions based
on the alternative theories under K.S.A. 213439(a)(4) and (a)(6).
We affirm J. Carr's convictions on Counts 9
through 24. Because four pairs of these
counts were charged in the alternative, this
results in affirmance of 12 rather than 16
convictions.
The convictions based on Counts 25, 26, and
29 through 40 are void for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. We affirm the
convictions based on Counts 27 and 28. We
affirm J. Carr's conviction on Count 41. We
reverse his conviction on Count 42 because it
is multiplicitous with Count 41.
We affirm J. Carr's convictions on Counts 43
through 55.
PENALTY PHASE
The general factual and procedural
background for the penalty phase issues in
this case is set out in full in the R. Carr
opinion. We need not repeat it or supplement
it here. In addition, nearly all penalty phase
legal issues raised by J. Carr are discussed as

needed and disposed of in the R. Carr
opinion. We therefore merely list them with
accompanying short responses.
P1. Did the district judge err in refusing to
sever the penalty phase of defendants' trial?
A majority of six members of the court
answers this question yes for reasons
explained in Section P1 of the R. Carr
opinion and because of the family
circumstances argument raised by J. Carr.
The majority also relies on the prejudice to J.
Carr flowing from R. Carr's visible handcuffs
during the penalty phase. One member of the
court dissents and writes separately on this
issue. A majority of six members of the court
agrees that this error requires J. Carr's
remaining death sentence to be vacated,
consistent with Section P1 of the R. Carr
opinion. One member of the court dissents
and writes separately on this issue.
P2. Despite compliance with K.S.A. 214624(a), was it constitutional error to omit
the four aggravating circumstances asserted
by the State from the complaint? To provide
guidance on remand, the court unanimously
answers this question no for reasons
explained in Section P2 of the R. Carr
opinion.
P3. Did the four aggravating circumstances
asserted by the State adequately channel the
jury's discretion in arriving at the sentence of
death? To provide guidance on remand, the
court unanimously answers this question yes
for reasons explained in Section P3 of the R.
Carr opinion.
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P4. Does the unavailability of a transcript of
the jury view deprive J. Carr of a meaningful
opportunity for appellate review of his death
sentence? To provide guidance on remand,
the court unanimously answers this question
no for reasons explained in Section P4 of the
R. Carr opinion.
P5. Does K.S.A. 21-4624(c)'s allowance of
testimonial hearsay (a) offend the heightened
reliability standard applicable in death
penalty cases, or (b) violate the Confrontation
Clause of the United State Constitution and
Crawford v. Washington? To provide
guidance on remand, the court unanimously
answers the first question no for reasons
explained in Section P5 of the R. Carr
opinion. To provide further guidance on
remand, the Court unanimously answers the
second question yes for reasons explained in
Section P5 of the R. Carr opinion.

that should govern consideration if this
question arises again.
P8. Did the district judge err in denying an
opportunity for surrebuttal testimony? For
reasons explained in Section P8 of the R. Carr
opinion, the court unanimously agrees that
the district judge abused his discretion. The
court declines to reach the issue of
harmlessness because of the necessity of
remand.

P6. Did the district judge err in excluding
mitigating evidence of (a) likelihood of
parole, or (b) the anticipated impact of J.
Carr's execution? To provide guidance on
remand, the court unanimously answers the
first question no for reasons explained in
Section P6 of the R. Carr opinion. To provide
further guidance on remand, in Section P6 of
the R. Carr opinion, the court discusses the
standard that should govern consideration if
the second question arises again.

P9. Must J. Carr's sentencing on his
noncapital convictions have occurred before
the penalty phase of his trial, and, if so,
should the jury have been informed of the
sentences he would serve if he were not
sentenced to death? For reasons explained in
Section P9 of the R. Carr opinion, the court
declines to reach the merits of the first part of
this question because it is moot and, to
provide guidance on remand, unanimously
answers the second part of the question no.
P10. Did the district judge err in failing to
instruct the jury that the existence of
mitigating factors need not be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt? To provide guidance on
remand, for reasons explained in Section P10
of the R. Carr opinion, a majority of five
members of the court answers this question
yes. Two members of the court dissent, and
one of them writes separately for the two on
this issue.

P7. Did the district judge err by permitting
the State's rebuttal witness to testify that he
had consulted other experts and that they
agreed with his opinion? To provide
guidance on remand, in Section P7 of the R.
Carr opinion, the court discusses the standard

P11. Did the district judge err by failing to
instruct jurors that "the crime" to be
considered when evaluating aggravating
circumstances was capital murder? In Section
P11 of the R. Carr opinion, we discuss this
issue to provide guidance on remand.
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P12. Was the jury instruction on the role of
mercy clearly erroneous? To provide
guidance on remand, for reasons explained in
Section P12 of the R. Carr opinion, the court
unanimously answers this question no.
P13. Did the wording of Instruction 10, when
read with the verdict forms, misstate the law
on the need for jury unanimity on mitigating
factors not outweighing aggravating factors?
To provide guidance on remand, for reasons
explained in Section P13 of the R. Carr
opinion, the court unanimously answers this
question yes.
P14. Must J. Carr's death sentence be vacated
because a fact necessary to imposition of the
penalty—his age of 18 or older at the time of
the capital crimes—was not submitted to the
jury or found beyond a reasonable doubt? For
reasons explained in Section P14 of the R.
Carr opinion, the court declines to reach the
merits of this issue because the situation that
prompted it is unlikely to arise again on
remand.
P15. Does K.S.A. 21-3205 authorize
punishing an aider and abettor the same as a
principal? In Section P16 of the R. Carr
opinion, the court declines to reach the merits
of this issue because the record on appeal
does not demonstrate that R. Carr was
convicted of capital murder as an aider and
abettor. This is also true of J. Carr, and no
further discussion of the issue is warranted in
this opinion.
P16.
Is
the
unconstitutionally

death

punishment as applied to aiders and abettors
of capital murder under Section 9 of the
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights? In
Section P17 of the R. Carr opinion, the court
declines to reach the merits of this issue
because the record on appeal does not
demonstrate that R. Carr was convicted of
capital murder as an aider and abettor. This is
also true of J. Carr, and no further discussion
of the issue is warranted in this opinion.
P17. Was the penalty phase infected by
prosecutorial misconduct? J. Carr argues that
one prosecutor's multiple references to his
unadjudicated criminal conduct and his
jailhouse bragging about shooting the
Birchwood victims and the crude reason for
raping one of the female victims were
misconduct. Even though one such reference
during closing argument was the subject of a
successful objection and an order for the jury
to disregard it, J. Carr argues the damage was
incurable. Defense counsel's earlier objection
suggesting that the prosecutor could not refer
to such material without being able to "prove
it up" had been overruled. This objection
probably should have been sustained by
Judge Clark. For reasons explained in Section
P18 of the R. Carr opinion, the court declines
to reach the further merits of this issue
because the situations that prompted it are
unlikely to arise again on remand.
P18. Do verdict forms such as those used in
this case pose a threat of double jeopardy?
For reasons explained in Section P19 of the
R. Carr opinion, the court declines to reach
the merits of this issue because it is unripe.

penalty
an
disproportionate
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P19. Does Kansas' execution protocol protect
against unnecessary pain? For reasons
explained in Section P20 of the R. Carr
opinion, the court declines to reach the merits
of this issue because it is unripe.
CONCLUSION FOR PENALTY PHASE
Because the district judge's failure to sever
the penalty phase of defendants' trial violated
J. Carr's Eighth Amendment right to an
individualized sentencing determination and
cannot be deemed harmless error, the death
sentence for J. Carr's remaining K.S.A. 213439(a)(6) conviction for the murders of
Heather M., Aaron S., Brad H., and Jason B.
is vacated. The case is remanded to the
district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
***
BEIER, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent
from two of the majority's rulings on the guilt
phase of Jonathan Carr's trial: cumulative
error and sufficiency of evidence on Count
41.
As discussed in my separate opinion in
Reginald Carr's appeal, two of the district
judge's errors—failure to sever the guilt
phase of the defendants' trial and rejection of
the reverse Batson peremptory challenge—
may have been reversible standing alone.
Even if the court is unwilling to go that far
today, when these two errors are considered
with the six other J. Carr errors upon which
the court unanimously agrees—erroneous
instructions on the sex-crime based capital
murders, multiplicity of the multiple-

homicide based capital murders, lack of
subject matter jurisdiction for the victim-onvictim sex charges, automatic exclusion of
expert testimony on the reliability of
eyewitness
identifications,
erroneous
instruction on eyewitness certainty, and
erroneous instruction on aiding and
abetting—and Judge Paul Clark's refusal to
grant J. Carr's motion for mistrial after
opening statements, reversal of all of J. Carr's
convictions under the cumulative error
doctrine is unavoidable. Despite weighty
evidence, there was simply too much
pervasive and interrelated error in the guilt
phase of J. Carr's trial for me to be confident
in the outcome.
I also would hold, for the reasons stated in my
separate opinion in the R. Carr appeal, that
the evidence supporting Holly G.'s digital
self-rape under Count 41 was insufficient to
convict J. Carr as a principal. This would
mean that Count 42 can stand, rather than
being reversed as multiplicitous.
LUCKERT, and JOHNSON, JJ., join the
foregoing concurring and dissenting
opinion.
***
JOHNSON, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part: I join the separate opinion
authored by Justice Beier, but I write
separately because I believe that the district
court erred in refusing to change the venue of
the trial and that this defendant's felony
murder conviction should be reversed for
want of sufficient evidence.
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The district court ignored statistically valid
evidence that prejudice against the defendant
was pervasive throughout Sedgwick County
to the extent that one could not expect to find
an unbiased jury pool in that community. My
rationale in this case is the same as set forth
in my separate opinion in codefendant
Reginald Carr's opinion, which I adopt here
by reference.
Specific to this case, however, I cannot find
in the record sufficient competent evidence
from which a rational jury could have found
J. Carr guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
the felony murder of Linda Ann Walenta.
Instead of basing its prosecution upon proven
facts and the relevant inferences that could
reasonably be drawn from those proven facts,
the State relied on speculation as to what
might have happened.
As with the change of venue issue, the
sufficiency of the evidence issue involves the
defendant's constitutionally guaranteed
individual rights. The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution requires the State to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and
every element necessary to constitute the
crime charged. While that right emanates
from the "people's document," the
constitution, its enforcement will not always
be publicly applauded. Nevertheless, it is
incumbent upon this court to make the State
comply with its constitutional burden of
proof, without regard to the popularity of the
result.
As the majority notes, the defense complains
of impermissible "inference-stacking." This

court has previously tried to explain that
prohibition by stating that "inferences may be
drawn only from facts established," that is,
inferences may not rest upon another
inference. But here, the majority appears to
focus on its notion of the difference between
direct evidence and circumstantial evidence,
which leads it to recite the familiar mantra
that even the most serious crime may be
proved by circumstantial evidence. Then, the
majority declares that circumstantial proof is
not the same as impermissible inferencestacking.
Certainly, I cannot quibble with the notion
that just because the State's case is based on
circumstantial evidence does not mean that
the State is relying on impermissible
inference-stacking. But that statement does
not answer the question presented here. We
are looking at the quality of the evidence,
rather than the type of evidence. To support a
conviction, the evidence must be competent
evidence, even if it is circumstantial in
nature. In Williams, 229 Kan. at 648, we
noted that "[c]onvictions based upon
circumstantial evidence . . . can present a
special challenge to the appellate court" when
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
because we only permit juries "to draw
justifiable
inferences
from
proven
circumstances and established facts."
Williams set forth an alternative explanation
of the prohibited practice of inferencestacking by specifically placing it in the
context of circumstantial evidence: "'[W]here
reliance is placed upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances in question must
themselves be proved and cannot be inferred
or presumed from other circumstances.'"
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Here, to get to the circumstances that would
support a reasonable inference that the
defendant committed the crime of felony
murder, one has to make presumptions and
inferences from other circumstances.
When reviewing whether the record contains
substantial competent evidence, I find it
helpful to first review what elements or
claims the State was required to prove in
order to obtain a constitutional conviction on
the charged crime. As noted, the charged
crime was felony murder, the definition of
which is located in the first-degree murder
statute and requires "the killing of a human
being committed . . . in the commission of,
attempt to commit, or flight from an
inherently dangerous felony as defined in
K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto."
K.S.A. 21-3401(b). In this case, the State
alleged that the underlying felony was an
attempt to commit aggravated robbery upon
Walenta. "Robbery is the taking of property
from the person or presence of another by
force or by threat of bodily harm." K.S.A. 213426. That crime is an aggravated robbery if
the robber is armed with a dangerous weapon
or inflicts bodily harm upon a person during
the robbery. "An attempt is any overt act
toward the perpetration of a crime done by a
person who intends to commit such crime but
fails in the perpetration thereof or is
prevented or intercepted in executing such
crime." K.S.A. 21-3301(a).
But the State did not allege that J. Carr killed
Walenta or that he attempted to rob her.
Rather, the State's felony-murder prosecution
of J. Carr was based on the theory that he
aided and abetted his brother, R. Carr, who

was the person that killed Walenta while
attempting to rob her. K.S.A. 21-3205(1)
provides that "[a] person is criminally
responsible for a crime committed by another
if such person intentionally aids, abets,
advises, hires, counsels or procures the other
to commit the crime." To be criminally
responsible, a defendant must aid and abet
the principal either before or during the
commission of the crime and, most
importantly, the aider and abettor must
possess the intent to promote or assist in the
commission of the charged crime. Mere
association with the principal who actually
committed the crime or mere presence in the
vicinity of the crime is insufficient to
establish guilt as an aider and abettor. In other
words, one is not criminally responsible for
accidentally aiding and abetting the
commission of a crime; the defendant has to
know that the principal is going to commit the
charged crime and possess the same criminal
intent as the principal in order to be convicted
of that crime as an aider and abettor.
With the foregoing in mind, the prosecutor's
theory of prosecution in this case required the
State to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt that J. Carr intentionally drove R. Carr
to the site of the crime, with the intent to
promote or assist R. Carr in taking property
from Walenta by force or by threat of bodily
injury while armed with the handgun that J.
Carr may or may not have provided, and that
during the armed robbery attempt, R. Carr
killed Walenta.
The obvious first hurdle for the prosecution
was that it had absolutely no proof that R.
Carr was attempting an aggravated robbery
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when he shot Walenta, rather than attempting
a kidnapping or even murder. If his brother
was not attempting an aggravated robbery,
then J. Carr could not have been criminally
responsible for felony murder based on
aiding and abetting a nonexistent underlying
felony. Nevertheless, I will continue the
analysis as if R. Carr was attempting an
aggravated robbery.

for those facts to be established. But the
conclusion that someone other than the
gunman was the driver of the vehicle is
circumstantial evidence. It is only proved by
inferring or presuming from Walenta's direct
testimony that if the gunman was the only
person in the vehicle, it could not have pulled
away without the gunman being in the
vehicle.

At this point, it might be helpful to briefly
discuss the difference between circumstantial
evidence and direct evidence. The dictionary
definition of "direct evidence" is particularly
germane here because it also places the term
in the context of an inference or presumption,
to-wit: "Evidence that is based on personal
knowledge or observation and that, if true,
proves a fact without inference or
presumption." Ironically, the majority
provides an excellent example of the
difference.

But, of course, the direct evidence from
Walenta does not establish the elements of
felony murder against J. Carr. The only other
persons who were in a position to personally
observe the crime and have personal
knowledge of any fact that would not require
an inference or presumption for proof are the
gunman and vehicle driver, alleged to be R.
Carr and J. Carr. Neither brother testified or
gave a statement admitting that J. Carr drove
the car to assist R. Carr in an armed robbery.
Even the permissible inference from direct
evidence that the majority points out—that
someone other than the shooter was driving
the car—is insufficient to prove the elements
of felony murder outlined above. To get to
the elements of the crime, one will need more
circumstantial evidence from which to draw
reasonable inferences.

After describing Walenta's personal
observation that the gunman emerged from
the passenger seat of a light-colored car
which pulled away from its parking place
immediately after the shooting, the majority
declares that "[a] juror need only make one
inference from these facts to arrive at a
finding that there was another person driving
the car that followed her." Slip op. at 36.
Walenta's statement of what she personally
knew from her own observation was direct
evidence of the following facts: The gunman
exited from the passenger side of a vehicle;
the vehicle was light-colored; and the vehicle
pulled away from its parking place
immediately after the shooting. One need
draw no inference or make any presumption

In my view, a circumstance that was
absolutely essential for the prosecution to
establish to permit a rational jury to convict
J. Carr of felony murder based upon the
State's theory of prosecution was that J. Carr
was driving the light-colored car that
Walenta observed. But that circumstantial
evidence—that J. Carr was driving the lightcolored car—was not established with proven
facts. There was no witness that identified J.
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Carr as the vehicle driver. No witness even
saw the driver to be able to provide a
description that could be matched against J.
Carr.
The only way to establish that J. Carr was
driving the car used in the crime is to presume
that circumstance based upon other
circumstantial evidence. For instance,
Tronda Adam's testimony placing J. Carr
with R. Carr not long after Walenta was shot
is not direct evidence that they were together
during the shooting. Contrary to the
majority's characterization, that testimony
was circumstantial because Adams did not
personally observe the brothers commit the
crime together. To be relevant to J. Carr's
prosecution for felony murder, the jury had to
infer that, if the brothers were together after
the shooting, they must have been together
during the shooting. Then, from the
circumstance that the brothers were together
during the shooting, the jury would need to
infer that J. Carr was driving the light-colored
car at the scene of the crime. From the
circumstance that J. Carr was driving the
vehicle at the scene of the crime, the jury
would have to infer that he was doing so in
order to knowingly promote or assist his
brother in the commission of a crime. And
because the State said so, the jury would need
to infer or presume that the intended crime
was aggravated robbery, rather than some
other crime such as kidnapping. If that is not
inference-stacking, I must confess that the
concept must be incomprehensible to me.
Likewise, the testimony describing the
vehicle the brothers were using the day of the
shooting required further presumptions and

inference-stacking
by
the
jury,
notwithstanding the majority's emphatic
denial that it did. Adams did not see the
brothers in the car together at the scene of the
Walenta killing. Therefore, her testimony did
not prove a fact that was relevant to the
felony-murder elements without a further
inference or presumption, i.e., it was not
direct evidence. Pointedly, no witness
provided information, such as a license tag
number, from which the owner of the lightcolored car at the crime scene could be
determined. No one even described the make
and model of the car carrying the gunman.
All the jury could do with Adams' testimony
was to speculate that the light-colored car
observed by Walenta was the same car that
Adams saw the brothers in at other times and
further infer that the brothers were still
together in that car at the crime scene, and
further presume that the unseen driver of the
light-colored car at the scene of the crime was
J. Carr, who presumably was knowingly
assisting his brother in committing an
aggravated robbery.
Likewise, Adams' testimony about the gun
does nothing to boost the State's case. Her
"direct observations" about what transpired
with the weapon at times other than the
shooting, provides absolutely no insight into
the elements of the felony-murder charge,
unless the jury simply guesses that J. Carr
must have given the weapon to R. Carr and
then presume that, in doing so, J. Carr knew
that R. Carr was planning to use the weapon
to commit an aggravated robbery.
Even if one eschews the term "inferencestacking," I cannot find that the jury had
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sufficient proven circumstances and
established facts to justify an inference that J.
Carr aided and abetted the felony murder of
Walenta. Without sufficient competent
evidence to support a constitutionally valid
conviction, this court has no choice but to
reverse the conviction.
Before concluding, however, I want to briefly
discuss my worst nightmare, i.e., that our
inference-stacking,
guilt-by-association,
character-propensity-reasoning decision
in State v. McBroom, would be applied
beyond its facts as establishing precedent for
upholding
convictions
based
upon
insufficient evidence. The majority cites to
McBroom to support its declaration that "the
evidence against J. Carr on the Birchwood
incident would naturally have reinforced the
evidence on the Walenta incident." Slip op. at
37. Why do I find that reasoning faulty? Let
me count the ways.
First, I would find that it would be quite
unnatural for the jury to use the evidence on
one charge to reinforce or influence its
decision on another charge, because the trial
judge specifically told the jurors not to do
that. PIK Crim. 3d 68.07, which the judge
followed in jury instruction No. 3, instructs a
jury as follows:
"Each crime charged against the
defendant is a separate and distinct
offense. You must decide each charge
separately on the evidence and law
applicable to it, uninfluenced by your
decision as to any other charge. The
defendant may be convicted or
acquitted on any or all of the offenses
charged. Your finding as to each
crime charged must be stated in a

verdict form signed by the Presiding
Juror."
Second, as noted above, mere association
with a principal actor is insufficient to
establish criminal responsibility as an aider
and abettor, even if the defendant is also
merely present at the crime scene.
Accordingly, guilty-by-association at another
crime scene cannot comport with the
constitutional requirement for the State to
prove each and every element of the charged
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Third, we at least pay lip service to the notion
that juries should not be permitted to convict
a defendant based upon character propensity
reasoning
"In the criminal context, the State
cannot present evidence that a
defendant committed a specific bad
act on another occasion solely to
establish a bad character propensity
as proof that the defendant must have
committed the currently charged
crime, i.e., defendant did bad before,
therefore defendant must have done
bad now."
That is precisely the reasoning the majority is
using; J. Carr did bad at the Birchwood
incident so he must have done bad at the
Walenta incident.
Fourth, "[u]nder our theory of criminal
jurisprudence in this nation, the defendant is
clothed with a presumption of innocence
until he is proven to be guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt by the State." Allowing the
State to use evidence of one crime to
"reinforce" its proof of another crime
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denigrates the defendant's presumption of
innocence. In other words, presuming that a
defendant did the charged crime because
there is evidence that he committed another
crime sounds more like bad people are
clothed with a presumption of guilt.
Fifth, as I noted above, the State is
constitutionally required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to prove each and every element
necessary to constitute the charged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Allowing the
State's proof of the charged crime to rely on
its having proved another crime reduces its
constitutional burden of proof and violates
the defendant's right to due process.
Finally, it is no answer to say that the jury has
spoken and an appellate court should not
interfere with that decision. To the contrary,
our failure to interfere when presented with a
constitutional violation is an abdication of
our role in the justice system. The jury is a
factfinder; it is not charged with the
responsibility (or authority) to decide
constitutional questions. Where the jury's
factfinding
exceeds
constitutional
boundaries, such as where it convicts a
defendant for the charged crime based upon
evidence that the defendant committed
another crime, this court must rectify the
violation.
In sum, the defendant's conviction for felony
murder was unsupported by substantial
competent evidence and should be reversed.

BILES, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part: I agree Jonathan Carr's
sentencing must be reversed and remanded
for new proceedings because the district
court failed to sever the cases following the
convictions. I write separately to note my
disagreement with the majority's dicta in
which it adopts a section in Reginald Carr's
opinion entitled "P10. Burden of Proof on
Mitigating Factors." The majority holds J.
Carr's sentence was imposed in violation of
the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution because the district court failed
to explicitly instruct the jury that mitigating
circumstances need not be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. I disagree.
As noted in more detail in my dissent in State
v. Gleason, the majority's conclusion defies
the United States Supreme Court's
established
Eighth
Amendment
jurisprudence and lacks any persuasive
analysis articulating why the circumstances
in this case justify a departure from that
precedent. The issue for Eighth Amendment
purposes is "whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury has applied the
challenged instruction in a way that prevents
the consideration of constitutionally relevant
evidence." The majority's conclusion is that a
per se violation of the Eighth Amendment
occurs if a jury instruction correctly states
that the State bears the burden of proving
aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt but fails to affirmatively
state that mitigation evidence need not be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

***
But this alone cannot justify reversal under
controlling Eighth Amendment precedent.

317

The next step must be to decide in the
absence of the instruction whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury has
applied the challenged instruction in a way
that prevents the consideration of
constitutionally relevant evidence. The
majority is wrong when it cuts the analysis
short and concludes the failure to simply
instruct the jury on mitigation forces an
automatic reversal.
The Eighth Amendment does not compel our
directive in State v. Kleypas, that any
mitigating circumstance instruction must
inform the jury that mitigating circumstances
need not be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. A finding that J. Carr's jury
instructions did not conform to the Kleypas
requirement is not an adequate basis for
concluding J. Carr's federal Eighth
Amendment rights were violated and reversal
is required.
I dissent from that portion of the opinion.
MORITZ, J., joins the dissenting portion
of the foregoing concurring and dissenting
opinion.
***
MORITZ, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part: I write separately for
several reasons, all of which are fully
explained in the Reginald Carr appeal, State
v. Carr. Rather than repeat that full
explanation here, I will simply summarize
those points on which I concur with and
dissent from the majority opinion.

First, I concur because while I agree with the
majority's decision to affirm Jonathan Carr's
convictions, including one capital murder
conviction, I disagree with the majority's
conclusion that the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to sever the defendants'
guilt phase trial. Even considering the joinder
as error, however, I believe the majority
properly finds any errors in the conviction
phase harmless and Jonathan Carr's
cumulative error argument unpersuasive.
Therefore, I concur with the majority opinion
affirming Jonathan Carr's convictions,
including one capital murder conviction.
Second, and more significantly, I dissent
from the majority's decision to reverse and
remand Jonathan Carr's death sentence. I
would find the district court did not err in
refusing to sever the defendants' penalty
phase trial. But even considering a joinder
error in the penalty phase, I would affirm the
jury's imposition of the death penalty for
Jonathan Carr. As more fully detailed in my
concurring and dissenting opinion in
Reginald Carr's appeal, I am convinced the
mitigating evidence simply pales in
comparison
to
the
aggravating
circumstances. I would hold beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury's decision to
impose the death penalty was not attributable
to any joinder error below.
Additionally, I join that portion of Justice
Biles' separate opinion dissenting from the
majority's "alternative" holding that the
district court erred in failing to instruct the
jury that mitigating circumstances need not
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Ultimately, I am convinced Jonathan Carr
received a fair trial and the jury imposed a
sentence of death because it understood that

the horrendous circumstances called for that
sentence. Because I would affirm Jonathan
Carr's death sentence, I dissent.
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“Carr Brothers’ Death Sentences to be Reviewed By U.S. Supreme
Court”
Associated Press
Roxana Hegeman
March 30, 2015
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
hear Kansas’ appeal seeking to reinstate
death sentences for Jonathan and Reginald
Carr, brothers convicted of robbing, sexually
assaulting and shooting five people in a
Wichita soccer field in 2000.
The court also agreed to review a separate
Kansas Supreme Court decision overturning
the death sentence of a man convicted of
killing a couple in Great Bend in 2004.
The justices said they will review the Kansas
high court’s rulings that threw out the
sentences for the Carr brothers and for Sidney
Gleason. The Kansas court hasn’t upheld a
death sentence since a new capital
punishment law was enacted in 1994. The
state’s last executions, by hanging, took place
in 1965.
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider
instructions given to jurors in the sentencing
phase of capital trials about evidence
favorable to the defendants as well as
whether sentencing the Carr brothers together
violated their rights.
Sedgwick County District Attorney Marc
Bennett said the Carr case is “important to us,
important to the victims, important to this
community. In terms of legal importance,
well, I guess that is in the eye of the beholder.

The U.S. Supreme Court obviously thought it
merited their attention.”
Sarah Johnson, an attorney with the state
capital appellate defender’s office who
represents Gleason and Jonathan Carr, said
they were “honestly a little surprised” that the
court agreed to hear the cases.
“We don’t think this is an issue that really is
worthy of the U.S. Supreme Court’s time and
attention, but we are confident that once they
get into it, they will recognize that the Kansas
Supreme Court acted well within its
discretion,” Johnson said.
The Kansas Supreme Court in July upheld
one conviction of capital murder with respect
to the Carr brothers but overturned their death
sentences. That same month, the court also
upheld Gleason’s conviction but reversed his
death sentence.
“We have carefully analyzed the opinions of
the Kansas Supreme Court and we do not
believe they have correctly applied the U.S.
Constitution,” Kansas Attorney General
Derek Schmidt said Monday in a statement.
“I am encouraged the U.S. Supreme Court
has agreed to review the cases.”
The Carr brothers broke into a Wichita home
in December 2000 and forced the five people
there to have sex with each other and later to
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withdraw money from ATMs. All five later
were taken to a snow-covered soccer field
and shot.
Four of them – 29-year-old Aaron Sander,
27-year-old Brad Heyka, 26-year-old Jason
Befort and 25-year-old Heather Muller –
died. One woman survived a gunshot wound
to the head and ran through the snow to seek
help.
Gleason was convicted for the 2004 murders
of Mikiala Martinez and her boyfriend,
Darren Wornkey. Martinez was a potential
witness against Gleason in an earlier crime.
The cases will be argued in Washington in the
fall.
Even if the Kansas Supreme Court decision
stands, the Carrs remain convicted of murder

and other crimes that will keep them in prison
for decades, Bennett said last summer
following the state Supreme Court’s
decision.
“Best case scenario, we’re talking 70, 80
years from now before either would see a
parole board,” he said.
The most important issue in the case, Bennett
said at the time, is whether the judge caused
an unfair situation by trying the brothers
together instead of separately.
“Our argument would be however you would
have tried it, however it was done, the
evidence was such that it would have made
no functional difference, (that) any jury,
however it was empaneled, would have
reached the same conclusion,” Bennett said.

321

“How the ‘Wichita Massacre’ Became a Factor in the Kansas Gov’s
Race”
The National Review
Ryan Lovelace
October 22, 2014
One of the most horrendous crimes in
Kansas’s history has become an issue in the
state’s hard-fought gubernatorial race.
Jonathan and Reginald Carr received death
sentences from the state more than a decade
ago for a crime spree that involved rape,
robbery, and murder, and culminated in the
“Wichita Massacre” killings of four people
and a dog. When the Kansas Supreme Court
overturned the brothers’ death sentences in a
6–1 decision earlier this summer, the reprieve
drew the ire of Republican governor Sam
Brownback, who’s now running for
reelection.
At a debate on Tuesday, Brownback cited the
case as an example of the importance of
judicial
appointments.
“[Democratic
gubernatorial candidate] Paul Davis wants to
continue to appoint liberal judges to that
court; I want to appoint judges who will
interpret the law, not rewrite it as they choose
to see it to be,” Brownback said. “One of the
supreme-court justices [involved in the case]
even hosted a fundraiser for Paul Davis in her
home. I find that wrong. It’s something that
shouldn’t happen.”
That fundraiser was held at the home of
Justice Carol Beier, who was appointed to the
court in 2003 by former Democratic governor
Kathleen Sebelius. Beier was actually the
lone dissent from the Carr brothers’ death
sentences, but only because she thought the

death-penalty reprieve didn’t go far enough
— she wanted a reversal of their convictions.
Brownback released an ad before Tuesday’s
debate hitting Davis for siding with the
liberal justices.
At the end of the debate, Davis pushed back
against Brownback’s claim. “When I decided
to get into this race I knew that Governor
Brownback would run an ugly campaign of
personal attacks, but I didn’t think the ads
could get any sleazier,” Davis said. “I turned
on my television this morning and I saw an
ad that is running linking me to the Carr
brothers’ murders. I knew one of the victims
of the Carr brothers. Governor, you trying to
exploit that terrible tragedy to help get
reelected is disgraceful.”
Brownback has faced criticism for his own
judicial choices: In August, he appointed
Caleb Stegall, a first-year state court-ofappeals judge, to Kansas’s highest court.
Stegall previously worked as general counsel
for Brownback and for conservative group
Americans for Prosperity, leading Davis to
knock the pick as an example of
Brownback’s rewarding a political ally over
choosing someone with more judicial
experience.
Much of the race has focused on debates over
conservative policy choices, on taxes and
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social issues, that Brownback has made
during his first term as governor.
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“Kansas Court Overturns Brother’s Death Sentences”
CBS
July 25, 2014
The Kansas Supreme Court on Friday
overturned the death sentences of two
brothers convicted of capital murder in a
crime spree in Wichita in 2000 including
robbery, rape, forced sex and four fatal
shootings in a snow-covered soccer field.
The court also struck down three of the four
capital murder convictions each against
Jonathan and Reginald Carr. It upheld one
capital murder conviction for each of them.
Their cases will return to Sedgwick County
District Court for further hearings.
The court's majority overturned their death
sentences because the presiding judge did not
hold separate proceedings for each man. In
overturning most of their capital convictions,
the majority said the instructions to jurors
were flawed.
The justices on Friday issued a separate
ruling for each brother.
The Carr brothers' crimes are among the most
notorious in the state since the 1959 slayings
of a western Kansas family that inspired the
classic book, "In Cold Blood."
The victims in the December 2000 attacks
that culminated in a bloody scene in a snowy
field were: Aaron Sander, 29; Brad Heyka,
27; Jason Befort, 26; and Heather Muller, 25.
Another woman who was shot in the head
survived and ran naked through the snow to

seek help, becoming a key witness at the
brothers' trial.
Prosecutors said the five friends were in a
Wichita home when two armed intruders
forced them to engage in sex with each other
and later made them withdraw money from
automatic teller machines. The two women
were raped repeatedly before the five were
taken to the soccer field and shot while they
were kneeling.
The Carr brothers also were convicted of
first-degree murder in connection with the
fatal shooting of a 55-year-old cellist, Ann
Walenta of Wichita, only days before the
spree that left four dead.
Jonathan Carr, now 34, and Reginald Carr,
36, were in their early 20s when the crimes
occurred. Together, they were convicted of
93 crimes, including rape, aggravated
kidnapping and aggravated robbery and
sentenced to death. The Supreme Court
upheld a total of 57 convictions against them.
Five other convicted murderers, all men,
remain on death row in Kansas. The state
Supreme Court last week overturned the
death sentence of Sidney Gleason in the
killings of a Great Bend couple in 2004. Last
year it ordered a new trial for Scott Cheever
in the shooting of the Greenwood County
sheriff in 2005, though the U.S. Supreme
Court later ordered the Kansas court to
reconsider.
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Kansas' last legal executions were in 1965, by
hanging. The current capital punishment law
was enacted in 1994, but the state's highest
court has yet to approve any death sentences,

which has led to criticism from legislators
and other officials who support the death
penalty.
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Montgomery v. Louisiana
14-7505
Ruling Below: State v. Montgomery, 141 So.3d 264 (La. 2014), cert granted
Henry Montgomery has been incarcerated since 1963. Montgomery is serving a mandatory life
sentence for a murder he committed just 11 days after he turned seventeen years of age. In light
of Miller v. Alabama, which holds that mandatory sentencing schemes “requiring that all
children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of
parole”…violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, Montgomery
filed a state district court motion to correct his illegal sentence. The trial court denied
Montgomery’s motion, and on direct writ application, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied
Montgomery’s application, citing State v. Tate, which held that Miller is not retroactive on
collateral review to those incarcerated in Louisiana.
Question Presented: Whether Miller adopts a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on
collateral review to people condemned as juveniles to die in prison?

State of LOUISIANA
Plaintiff
v.
Henry MONTGOMERY
Defendant
19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge
January 30, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
Having considered Defendant’s Motion to
Correct an Illegal Sentence filed in the above
numbered and captioned cause,
It is ordered that the motion is DENIED.
The defendant was convicted of the murder
of Charles Hurt in February of 1964. At the
time of the offense, the defendant was
seventeen years of age. The defendant was
granted a new trial in 1969, but was found

guilty again in February of 1969 and was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held
that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in
prison without possibility of parole for
juvenile offenders.” In order for a new rule to
overcome the bar to retroactivity on collateral
review, one of the two Teague exceptions
must be met. Teague v. Lane. The first
exception applies when a new rule
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completely removes a particular punishment
from the list of punishments that can be
constitutionally imposed on a class of
defendants.
Therefore, it does not satisfy the first
exception for retroactivity because it does not
categorically bar all sentences of life
imprisonment for juveniles. Miller bars only
those sentences made mandatory by a
sentencing scheme.

The second exception applies to “watershed
rules of criminal procedure implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the
criminal proceeding.” The holding in Miller
does not qualify as a “watershed rule,” and
therefore, does not satisfy the requirements of
the second exception of Teague.
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the
present case does not overcome the general
bar to retroactivity and the Defendant’s
motion is DENIED.
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“The Supreme Court Takes One More Look at Life Sentences for
Teens”
Bloomberg
Matt Stroud
March 23, 2015
The U.S. Supreme Court added a case to its
docket on Monday that will determine
whether juveniles sentenced years ago to life
without parole should be re-sentenced. The
latest case, Montgomery v. Louisiana, comes
in the wake of a 2012 ruling that sentences of
life without parole for juveniles are
unconstitutional. About 1,500 people in the
U.S. remain incarcerated under such
sentences.
The U.S. had, until recently, been the only
developed country in the world in which
people under 18 could be punished with life
in prison without the possibility of parole (a
sentence known as juvenile life without
parole, or JLWOP). For almost a decade, the
Supreme Court has written opinions that have
chiseled away at laws allowing—and in some
cases, mandating—that kids convicted of
certain crimes such as murder must serve the
rest of their lives behind bars.
In the 2012 case, Miller v. Alabama, the
Supreme
Court
found
JLWOP
unconstitutional and barred future sentences.
But the justices did not offer guidance as to
whether the 1,500 prior JLWOP convicts
should be re-sentenced. That left a question

on the table: Should the Miller decision be
retroactive? Should people who have already
been sentenced to JLWOP be re-sentenced to
less severe penalties?
The Supreme Court decided late last year to
hear arguments about this question in a case
called Toca v. Louisiana. But after the high
court agreed to hear the case, the local district
attorney offered a deal to the plaintiff, George
Toca: Plea to a lesser charge and be released.
Toca, who has maintained his innocence, had
been behind bars more than three decades in
the notoriously brutal Louisiana State
Penitentiary known as Angola. He took the
deal and was freed from prison.
That was good news for him, but it led to his
Supreme Court case being dropped, leaving
the question of retroactivity up in the air. The
Supreme Court's decision to hear
Montgomery v. Louisiana promises to take
things out of limbo.
The case involves Henry Montgomery, a 17year-old 10th grader who shot and killed a
Baton Rouge deputy in 1963 while playing
hooky from school. The Supreme Court will
hear arguments in Montgomery's case this
fall.
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“U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Baton Rouge Case to Re-Evaluate
Life Sentences for Murders by Juveniles”
The Acadiana Advocate
Joe Gyan Jr.
March 25, 2015
Becky Wilson forgave Henry Montgomery
years ago for the 1963 murder of her father,
East Baton Rouge Parish sheriff’s deputy
Charles H. Hurt, but that doesn’t mean she
wants him to go free.
Montgomery, 17 years old when Hurt was
gunned down in a Scotlandville field, has
been locked up since the day after the killing.
Next fall, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear
arguments to decide whether Montgomery,
now 68, should have a chance to leave prison.
The justices will weigh whether their June
2012 decision banning automatic life terms
for juveniles convicted of murder should
apply to older cases.
For Wilson, who lost her father when she was
9, the answer is clear.
“Unfortunately, our sentence has no way of
being overturned or commuted. We live with
this forever,” Wilson, 60, said from Hope,
Arkansas. “My mother served a life sentence
without her husband; my brother, sister and I
have served a life sentence without our
father; my children, nieces and nephews have
served a sentence of never knowing their
grandfather.”
Montgomery was convicted and sentenced to
death in 1964, then retried in 1969 and
convicted and sentenced to life in prison
without parole.

“I don’t feel vindictive toward the man. I feel
like he got two fair trials,” Wilson said. “I’m
not upset the death sentence was overturned.”
Montgomery, who escaped for just a few
hours with seven others from the East Baton
Rouge Parish jail in 1966, has been denied
release four times — in 1971, 1995, 1999 and
2001, she added.
“They had more than enough time to consider
his background,” Wilson said.
In its 2012 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court
said by a 5-4 vote that states can no longer
automatically sentence juveniles convicted of
murder to life in prison without parole
without first holding a sentencing hearing to
consider the defendant’s youth, upbringing,
circumstances of the crime and other factors.
The court found that “youth matters for
purposes of meting out the law’s most serious
punishments.” In an opinion written by
Justice Elena Kagan, the court said that
children simply don’t have the same mental
capacity as adults, so they should be treated
differently. The decision noted “children’s
diminished culpability and heightened
capacity for change.”
The ruling, in a case called Miller v.
Alabama, did not ban juvenile life sentences
altogether; the high court only outlawed the
automatic imposition of the sentence. Judges
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must consider each defendant’s case
individually, taking into consideration the
child’s home life and ability to be
rehabilitated.
The high court, however, did not say whether
the decision applied retroactively to inmates
across the country serving life terms for
killings they committed when they were
under 18.
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
Corrections spokeswoman Pam Laborde said
Tuesday that as of April 2013, there were 332
offenders in state custody who were
sentenced to life without parole as juveniles
for various crimes, including first- and
second-degree murder and aggravated rape.
The bulk of them were sentenced before the
Supreme Court’s ruling.
Courts in various states have split on whether
the Miller ruling should be retroactive.
Supreme courts in Louisiana, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania and Michigan have ruled that
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 decision
should not be applied to cases prior to the
decision. Intermediate appeals courts in
Florida and Michigan have ruled the same
way.
The Louisiana high court, in a 5-2 decision in
November 2013, concluded that federal law
only makes a new ruling from the U.S.
Supreme Court apply retroactively when
there is a “substantive” issue decided, such as
the banning of a kind of punishment entirely
or a crime deemed unconstitutional. An
example would be the 2005 abolition of the
death penalty for juvenile offenders.

The state Supreme Court found that the
Miller decision was a procedural one, so it
does not apply to past cases.
The Louisiana case centered around Darryl
Tate, who was 17 when he robbed a man of
40 cents and shot him in the chest.
Tate pleaded guilty in Orleans Parish in 1981
to second-degree murder and was sentenced,
automatically under state law, to spend the
rest of his life in prison without hope for
parole.
In the Montgomery case, the Louisiana
Attorney General’s Office — which is
handling the arguments for the East Baton
Rouge Parish District Attorney’s Office —
emphasizes that the Miller decision does not
bar life sentences without the possibility of
parole. Instead, it replaced an automatic
mandate with the requirement to hold a
hearing.
Attorney General’s Office spokeswoman
Laura Gerdes Colligan said the fact that
Montgomery killed Hurt is not in dispute.
“The Court did not grant review in this case
because of anything wrong with the
underlying murder conviction, but instead to
resolve an important legal question,” she
said. “The Attorney General’s Office and the
East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney’s
Office will vigorously defend the murder
conviction and sentence in this case, which
has been final for 45 years.”
Mark Plaisance, who will argue at the U.S.
Supreme Court on Montgomery’s behalf for
the East Baton Rouge Parish Public
Defenders Office, said he will make the
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argument that what the high court did in June
2012 represented a substantive change in the
law.
“Since it’s a substantive change it should
apply to everyone in that class,” he said.
The highest courts in Iowa, Mississippi and
most recently Florida, as well as midlevel
courts in Illinois and New Hampshire, have
decided that Miller v. Alabama does apply
retroactively, and the U.S. Department of
Justice has agreed.
Federal circuit courts have also divided on
the issue, with some tossing out previously
imposed life sentences and others upholding
them.
The U.S. Supreme Court will ultimately have
to settle the confusion.
In direct response to the high court’s 2012
ruling, the Louisiana Legislature approved a
measure during the 2013 regular session
requiring a sentencing judge to hold a hearing
to determine whether the sentence should be
imposed with or without parole eligibility. If
a sentence is imposed with eligibility for
parole, the legislation gives incarcerated
offenders a shot at freedom after serving 35
years for first- or second-degree murder,
according to the legislation that the governor
signed into law.
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded in
its 2013 decision that state lawmakers never
intended the law to be read to apply to those
already sentenced.
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Jeff
Hughes, Chief Justice Bernette Johnson

wrote, “Fundamental fairness in the
administration of justice requires that these
new laws apply to Darryl Tate, and all
defendants who are similarly situated in
Louisiana.”
The U.S. Supreme Court had agreed last fall
to decide about retroactivity in the New
Orleans case of George Toca, which was to
be heard at the high court later this month.
But Toca was released from prison earlier
this year under a plea deal in which he agreed
to drop his innocence claim in exchange for
pleading guilty to two counts of armed
robbery and manslaughter. His sentence was
equal to the time he had served.
Toca, who was barely 17 at the time of a fatal
1984 stickup, spent 31 years in prison.
In legal filings in that case about the
retroactivity issue, Orleans Parish District
Attorney Leon Cannizzaro’s office argued it
would be nonsensical to ask local judges
decades after a crime was committed to
evaluate a juvenile’s capacity to change.
Advocates for juvenile lifers countered that
judges could instead look at an inmate’s
record while behind bars.
Charles Hurt was 41 and living in Baker
when he was fatally shot by Montgomery, a
black Scotlandville High School 10th-grade
student who was described at the time as
answering to the nickname “Wolf Man.”
Montgomery told authorities he “panicked”
and shot Hurt on Nov. 13, 1963, with a stolen
.22-caliber pistol after the white officer
confronted him playing hooky in a wooded
field near the Anna T. Jordan Recreation
Center in Scotlandville.
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A news article in The Morning Advocate
printed the day after the killing described
Hurt as the first law enforcement officer in
East Baton Rouge Parish shot to death in
three decades. The authorities implemented
roadblocks and rounded up and jailed more
than 60 black men during the manhunt. The
article described the men as being “booked
for investigation.”
Defense witnesses at Montgomery’s trials
characterized him as being quiet, withdrawn

and a habitual thief. He was described as
having subnormal intelligence. He pleaded
not guilty by reason of insanity.
Wilson said her father was a gentle man who
had a great rapport and reputation with both
white and black people.
She said her family received a condolence
letter from President John F. Kennedy after
her father was killed. Kennedy was fatally
shot a week later in Dallas.
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“Supreme Court to Weigh Retroactivity of Mandatory JLWOP”
Juvenile Justice Information Exchange
Gary Gately
April 5, 2015
A U.S. Supreme Court decision could forever
alter the landscape of sentences of mandatory
juvenile life without parole, potentially
leading to resentencing hearings for some
2,100 convicted murderers.
The high court agreed on March 20 to hear a
case that could set a precedent on whether its
landmark 2012 Miller v. Alabama ruling
applies to cases decided before that ruling.
In the 5-4 Miller ruling, the court did not
specify definitively whether the decision
should apply retroactively, and lower federal
courts and state courts have been divided on
the issue.
If the Supreme Court decides Miller should
be applied retroactively, those sentenced
before the ruling to mandatory life without
parole for murders committed as juveniles
could receive sentence reviews. Depending
on the state, they could still be sentenced to
life without parole, to life with parole
eligibility after a specified number of years or
be released, likely for time served, said Emily
Keller, a staff attorney at the Juvenile Law
Center in Philadelphia.
Opponents of mandatory juvenile life without
parole (JLWOP) hailed the Supreme Court’s
decision to take up the retroactivity issue on
a Louisiana case, Montgomery v. Louisiana,
expected to be heard this fall.

“We’re really hopeful that the Supreme Court
will rule that Miller applies retroactively and
that the thousands of individuals serving
these unconstitutional sentences will have an
opportunity for new sentencing hearings,”
Keller said.
Of the court’s decision to take up the case,
Keller said: “It’s a very hopeful sign; it’s a
signal that the court thinks this is an
important issue that needs to be addressed,
and we’re hopeful that they’ll rule that Miller
does apply retroactively and that everyone
does get a chance to receive a constitutional
sentence.”
Florida just became the 10th state whose
Supreme Court ruled Miller v. Alabama
should apply retroactively. (The other states
are
Illinois,
Iowa,
Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
South Carolina, Texas and Wyoming.)
Courts in five states — Alabama, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota and Pennsylvania —
have ruled Miller does not apply
retroactively.
Keller said it’s patently unfair – and
unconstitutional – to allow when and where a
conviction took place to determine whether
someone gets a resentencing hearing.
“I believe it’s a matter of fairness and justice,
and whether or not you’re forced to serve an
unconstitutional sentence shouldn’t depend
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on the arbitrary date that your conviction
became final or the state where you reside,”
she said.
Heather Renwick, litigation counsel for
Washington-based nonprofit Campaign
the Fair Sentencing of Youth, also cited
split among state court rulings
retroactivity.

the
for
the
on

“It’s inconsistent treatment across the U.S.,
depending on what state you’re in,” Renwick
said. “So we’re hoping the U.S. Supreme
Court will hold that Miller v. Alabama is
retroactive so that every child sentenced
under a mandatory sentencing scheme to die
in prison will be afforded a second chance to
demonstrate rehabilitation and the capacity to
re-enter the community.”
In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
mandatory JLWOP violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and
unusual punishment.”
Renwick said that if mandatory JLWOP was
found to be cruel and unusual by the highest
court in the land, the standard should apply to
juveniles sentenced before the ruling.
Pennsylvania has the highest number of
prisoners serving mandatory JLWOP
sentences in the country, with some 500
inmates serving such sentences, including
Kenneth C. Crawford III (see related story).
The state’s juvenile lifers had their hopes for
a resentencing hearing dashed when the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled 4-3 in
October 2013 against applying Miller
retroactively.

In its ruling in Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. Ian Cunningham, the
Pennsylvania
high
court
stated:
“Significantly, for present purposes, the
Miller majority did not specifically address
the question of whether its holding applies to
judgments of sentence for prisoners, such as
Appellant, which already were final as of the
time of the Miller decision. As such, the
opinion does not set out the principles
governing the High Court’s retroactivity
jurisprudence.”
In Michigan, too, with nearly 350 inmates
serving terms of mandatory JLWOP, the state
Supreme Court ruled 4-3 in July that Miller
does not apply retroactively.
On the day the ruling was handed down,
Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette
said in a statement: "Today the Michigan
Supreme Court upheld the rights of crime
victims and their families. This ruling should
bring a measure of peace to the many families
who struggled with the possibility of painful
resentencing hearings for cases successfully
prosecuted decades ago."
In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the appellant in
the case, Henry Montgomery, received a
sentence of mandatory JLWOP for
murdering a police officer in 1963 less than
two weeks after his 17th birthday.
A Montgomery v. Louisiana petition to the
U.S. Supreme Court cited a lower federal
court ruling and argued that the Miller
decision is “a substantive constitutional rule
that mandates courts to implement a new
procedure in the sentencing of juveniles.”
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In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court pointed to
research showing adolescents’ brains are not
fully developed and that youths are more
susceptible than adults to peer pressure, more
reckless and impulsive, more likely to take
risks and less likely to consider long-term
consequences.
The court said life circumstances, including
trauma, must be taken into account in
sentencing — and, notably, also found
juveniles are amenable to rehabilitation, a
finding often cited by opponents of
mandatory JLWOP.
Mishi Faruqee, juvenile justice policy
strategist at the American Civil Liberties
Union, noted the United States is the only

country in the world to sentence juveniles to
life without parole. (The United Nations
special investigator on torture, Juan E.
Méndez, condemned juvenile life without
parole in a report last month.)
“A child should never be sentenced to die in
prison; I mean, they always have that
capacity for change,” Faruqee said.
“Part of the nature of being a child is you’re
still growing and developing who you are,
and so I think it’s absolutely unacceptable to
condemn a child to spend the rest of their life
in prison. And that’s something that the
whole world has recognized except the
United States.”
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“Lives Hang in Limbo: SCOTUS to Hear Case on Whether Ruling
Prohibiting Mandatory Life Sentences for Juveniles Applies
Retroactively”
Louisiana Law Review
Allison B. Kingsmill
April 13, 2015
On March 23, 2015, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Montgomery v. Louisiana to decide whether
its ruling in Miller v. Alabama, prohibiting
mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
juveniles convicted of murder, applies
retroactively—that is, to inmates convicted
before the decision was issued.
In Montgomery, Henry Montgomery was
convicted of murdering a deputy sheriff when
he was 17 years old and was automatically
sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole as required by Louisiana
law. Consequently, Montgomery was
sentenced to spend the rest of his life in
prison without any consideration of his
youth, the circumstances of the crime, or any
other mitigating facts. In his petition to the
Supreme Court, Montgomery claims that his
sentence subjects him to cruel and unusual
punishment, which violates the Eighth
Amendment and the previous Supreme Court
decision in Miller v. Alabama.
In Miller, the Supreme Court reviewed the
cases of two 14 year olds who were convicted
of murder and sentenced to statutorily
mandated punishments of life without parole.
The Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates
life in prison without the possibility of parole

for juvenile offenders. The Court emphasized
that “[m]andatory life without parole for a
juvenile precludes consideration of his
chronological age and its hallmark features—
among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and
failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”
Without considering the mitigating facts
relevant to youth, the Court concluded that
“such a scheme poses too great a risk of
disproportionate punishment.” As a result,
the Court did not categorically bar juvenile
life sentences without parole but indicated
that “occasions for sentencing juveniles to
this harshest possible penalty will be
uncommon.”
In light of the Miller decision, Montgomery
filed a motion to correct his illegal sentence,
arguing that he is entitled to a new sentencing
hearing with the possibility of parole.[
However, the state district court denied
Montgomery’s motion. Moreover, the
Louisiana
Supreme
Court
denied
Montgomery’s writ application, refusing to
apply Miller retroactively.
The United States Supreme Court has not
decided
whether
to
apply
Miller
retroactively. As a result, following Miller,
the retroactivity issue has divided state and
federal courts across the country. The
question before the Court in Montgomery is
whether Miller applies retroactively to
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defendants
who received statutorily
mandated life-without-parole sentences
before the Miller decision was handed down.
Most state courts, as well as six federal circuit
courts, have applied Miller retroactively,
interpreting it as a substantive rule banning
mandatory life sentences for juveniles. In
contrast, only four states—Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania—
have ruled against retroactivity, viewing
Miller as merely an announcement of a new
procedural rule.
In determining the retroactivity of Supreme
Court decisions, courts apply the standards
established by Teague v. Lane. In Teague, the
Court held that a new rule will be applied
retroactively if (1) it places “certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond
the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe” or (2) creates a
procedure “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.” Courts holding in favor of
retroactivity have concluded that Miller falls
within Teague’s first exception, because it
“explicitly forecloses the imposition of a
certain category of punishment—mandatory
life in prison without the possibility of
parole—on a specific class of defendants:
those individuals under the age of 18 when
they commit the crime of murder.”
On the other hand, courts ruling against
retroactivity have reasoned that Miller
mandated only that a court consider an
offender’s youth before imposing a particular
penalty and therefore “simply altered the
range of permissible methods for determining
whether a juvenile could be sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole.”

Amidst the division among states and the
need for uniformity, the United States
Supreme Court granted review of
Montgomery’s case and thereby decided to
end the uncertainty of Miller’s application.
The Supreme Court originally agreed in
December 2014 to consider the issue of
retroactivity in another Louisiana case, Toca
v. Louisiana. Similar to Montgomery,
George Toca received a mandatory-lifewithout-parole sentence when he was a
juvenile. However, after years of
incarceration, Toca accepted a plea deal with
prosecutors and was released from prison.
Consequently, his petition became moot
before the Supreme Court and was
automatically dismissed.
Montgomery and Toca’s petitions represent a
recurring issue before the Supreme Court and
present a critical question for juvenile
offenders already sentenced to life without
parole: Should they be resentenced?[
Prisoners sentenced to life as juveniles
receive new sentencing hearings across the
nation, while convicted juveniles like
Montgomery remain condemned to spend the
rest of their lives in prison. As a result,
whether Miller should be applied
retroactively is an important question that
must be resolved as soon as possible.
Whether the Court will apply Miller
retroactively remains uncertain. However, if
the Court finds in favor of retroactivity,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and
Pennsylvania will be most heavily impacted,
as they will have to review all previously
mandated life-without-parole sentences for
juvenile offenders.
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Luis v. United States
14-419
Ruling Below: United States v. Luis, 564 Fed. Appx. 493 (11th Cir. Fla. 2014)
This case presents an opportunity for the Court to resolve a circuit split on a question of
fundamental importance to the adversarial system of justice: whether the restraint of untainted
assets needed to retain counsel of choice in a criminal case violates the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Farmer has expressly held that "[w]hile
Caplin [& Drysdale, Chtd.] made absolutely clear that there is no Sixth Amendment right for a
defendant to obtain counsel using tainted funds, [a defendant] still possesses a qualified Sixth
Amendment right to use wholly legitimate funds to hire the attorney of his choice."
Addressing a pretrial restraint under 18 U.S.C. § 1345, the Eleventh Circuit in this case upheld a
preliminary injunction that currently restrains all of petitioner's assets, including undisputedly
untainted funds needed by her to engage private counsel in her criminal case. Ignoring the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Farmer and the important and historical distinction between tainted and
untainted assets, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Caplin to "foreclose" petitioner's constitutional
challenge to the pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted funds she needs to retain counsel of
choice.
Question Presented: Does the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant’s legitimate, untainted
assets (those not traceable to a criminal offense) needed to retain counsel of choice violate the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments?

UNITED STATES of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Sila LUIS
Defendant – Appellant
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Decided on May 1, 2014
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
Per Curium:
A federal grand jury in the Southern District
of Florida indicted Appellant Sila Luis
(“Luis”) for her role in an alleged Medicare
fraud scheme that included kickbacks paid to

patients who enrolled with her home
healthcare companies. In addition to charging
Luis with substantive offenses, the
indictment included forfeiture allegations

339

pursuant to the general criminal forfeiture
statute. The government brought this civil
action to restrain Luis’s assets, including
substitute property of an equivalent value to
that actually traceable to the scheme, before
her criminal trial.

Though we generally review a district court’s
grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of
discretion, we review questions of law, such
as a statute’s constitutionality and whether a
preliminary
injunction
violates
an
individual’s constitutional rights, de novo.

Federal law grants district courts the
authority to restrain, pretrial, the assets of
those accused of certain kinds of fraud. This
includes the authority to restrain “property of
equivalent value” to that actually traceable to
the alleged fraud. Among the enumerated
offenses is a “Federal health care offense,”
defined elsewhere to include conspiracy to
defraud the United States and to commit an
offense against it, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
371, and conspiracy to commit healthcare
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349.

After reviewing the record, reading the
parties’ briefs and having the benefit of oral
argument, we affirm the district court’s order
granting the government’s motion for a
preliminary injunction. The district court
conducted an evidentiary hearing where it
heard arguments and testimony and found,
based on the hearing and the indictment, that
there was probable cause to believe that Luis
committed an offense requiring forfeiture,
that she possessed forfeitable assets, and that
she was alienating those assets. The
arguments made by Luis in this appeal are
foreclosed by the United States Supreme
Court decisions in Kaley v. United States;
Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. United
States; United States v. Monsanto; and
United States v. DBB, Inc. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s order granting the
government’s motion for a preliminary
injunction.

In this separate civil case, the government
moved to restrain Luis’s assets pretrial, to
include substitute assets not directly traceable
to the alleged fraud. After granting a
temporary restraining order, the district court
held a hearing on a motion for preliminary
injunction and ultimately granted the motion.
Luis appeals that order, arguing she needs her
funds to pay her criminal defense lawyer and
that restraining those funds pretrial violates
her constitutional rights.

AFFIRMED.
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“Supreme Court to Decide Whether Criminal Defendants Have
Right to Hire Lawyers With Frozen Assets”
The Huffington Post
Samantha Lachman
June 8, 2015
The Supreme Court took up a case Monday
concerning whether the government can deny
criminal defendants untainted money they
need to hire an attorney of their choice.
The case, Sila Luis v. United States, will be
heard in the court's next term starting in the
fall. Luis was indicted in 2012 on fraud
charges involving $45 million in allegedly
illegal Medicare payments. The FBI said that
Luis, as president of a health care provider,
paid kickbacks and bribes to Medicare
patient recruiters and submitted false claims
for work done on behalf of the beneficiaries.
When federal prosecutors froze her assets,
Luis sued, arguing that not all her assets were
connected to the charges and that she needed
money to hire an attorney. Both a federal
district judge and federal appeals court ruled
in the government's favor, saying Luis did not
have a constitutional right to the funds.
The Justice Department has argued that the
government could freeze the funds. In its case
against Luis, the government said it was
putting assets on hold that would be forfeited
after the defendant was convicted, because
she had already spent the tainted money on
travel and luxury goods. The government has
argued it was making a forfeitable versus
nonforfeitable calculation, rather than a
tainted versus untainted one.

In petitions urging the Supreme Court to take
up the case, legal experts argued that the
justices should consider whether Luis' Sixth
Amendment right to hire counsel of her
choice should outweigh prosecutorial efforts
to recover the full value of the alleged fraud.
Last year, the court's justices ruled that
indicted defendants do not have a right to
challenge the forfeiture of their assets at a
hearing in order to hire attorneys to defend
them.
In a dissenting opinion to that decision, Chief
Justice John Roberts appeared to foreshadow
Luis' argument.
“Few things could do more to undermine the
criminal justice system’s integrity than to
allow the government to initiate a
prosecution and then, at its option, disarm its
presumptively innocent opponent by
depriving him of his counsel of choice,”
Roberts wrote. Such a move, he explained,
would be “fundamentally at odds with our
constitutional tradition and basic notions of
fair play.”
Asset forfeiture is increasingly becoming a
bipartisan cause of concern in Congress,
though the focus has been more on civil
forfeiture practices in states and local
communities.
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“High Court to Eye ‘Untainted’ Asset Freezes in Criminal Suits”
Law360
Jessica Corso
June 8, 2015
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether
the government can prevent criminal
defendants from using funds earned outside
the scope of an alleged crime to hire private
defense counsel, agreeing Monday to hear a
dispute over a Florida woman's alleged $45
million
Medicare
fraud
scheme.

millions of dollars she earned from private
insurers. The restraining order thus violates
the Fifth and Sixth amendments by allowing
the government to restrain an individual’s
ability to pay for the best defense possible in
a criminal trial, her Supreme Court petition
said.

The nation’s highest court took up an appeal
of an Eleventh Circuit decision that Sila Luis
could not free up funds frozen by the
government that she says she earned fair and
square, to hire private attorneys for her
criminal
suit.

“The government has no limit on how much
money it can spend to prosecute someone,”
Luis’ attorney Howard Srebnick of Black
Srebnick Kornspan & Stumpf PA told
Law360 on Monday. He noted that the case
outcome will impact not only his client but
the entire criminal defense bar, which might
have difficulty finding paying clients should
the Supreme Court uphold earlier rulings by
the Eleventh Circuit and the Florida district
court.

Luis has been accused of committing
Medicare fraud and violating the AntiKickback Statute by paying patients who
used her two at-home health companies so
that she could bill the government for
unnecessary or unprovided for services.
The criminal case has been put on hold,
however, while the government wrangles
with Luis’ attorneys over just how much
money they can prevent Luis from accessing.
The government has frozen Luis’ assets to the
tune of $45 million — the amount they claim
her companies earned in the scheme — so
that they can recoup the full amount should
she
be
found
guilty.
Luis’ attorneys say that she does not have
access to that amount of money and that to
make up for it, the government is digging into

When U.S. District Court Judge Paul C. Huck
ruled in June 2013 that the government could
freeze so-called untainted assets in case it
wins restitution, he used the example of a
bank robber who already spent the $100,000
he
stole
from
the
bank.
Say the bank robber has access to another
$100,000 he earned independently from the
robbery,
Judge
Huck
posited.
“Should his decision to spend the $100,000
he stole mean that he is free to hire counsel
with the other $100,000 when Congress has
authorized restraint of those substitute
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assets?” he asked. “The reasonable answer is
no.”
Monday's decision to consider that same
question comes a year after the Supreme

Court ruled that the government could
prevent defendants from accessing funds
that allegedly were obtained in the process of
a crime while their criminal suits are
ongoing.
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“If a Defendant Must Forfeit All Assets, Is Her Right To Counsel
Violated?”
The Christian Science Monitor
Warren Richey
May 14, 2015
The US Supreme Court is being asked to take
up a case testing whether federal prosecutors
are entitled to freeze all the assets of a
criminal defendant – even when some
of those assets are not tainted by any crime
and the funds are needed to pay for a defense
lawyer.
The question is whether the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to hire counsel of choice
should outweigh efforts by prosecutors to
recover the full value of an alleged fraud on
the government.
A petition urging the high court to examine
the issue is expected to be considered at the
justices' private conference on Thursday. An
announcement of whether they will hear the
case could come as early as Monday.
The issue is significant because the
government is increasingly using forfeiture
as a potent weapon to ensure – literally – that
crime doesn’t pay. For example, in a 15month period in 2012 and 2013, the Justice
Department seized $1.5 billion and returned
those assets to 400,000 crime victims,
including to the US Treasury.
Most forfeitures involve government claims
on stolen property or proceeds directly
traceable to criminal activity. But a growing
segment of seizures involves using civil
statutes to freeze financial and other assets

that are not proceeds of criminal activity or
otherwise tainted by crime.
In such cases, prosecutors are seeking to
freeze – and thus, preserve – untainted,
substitute assets that the government will be
able to claim at a later time in the event of a
conviction.
Here’s the problem: If that freeze occurs
before a criminal trial, the defendant may be
rendered broke and unable to hire a lawyer.
Critics say such heavy-handed tactics raise
fundamental questions about fairness,
property rights, and the right to use one’s own
money to hire an effective defense lawyer.
Chief Justice John Roberts touched on this
issue in a dissenting opinion last year.
“Few things could do more to undermine the
criminal justice system’s integrity than to
allow the government to initiate a
prosecution and then, at its option, disarm its
presumptively innocent opponent by
depriving him of his counsel of choice,”
Chief Justice Roberts wrote.
Such a move, he added, would be
“fundamentally at
odds
with
our
constitutional tradition and basic notions of
fair play.”
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The issue arises in a Miami Medicare fraud
case.
In October 2012, Sila Luis, president of two
heath-care companies, was indicted on
charges that she and others defrauded the
Medicare program of $45 million during a
six-year period.
Investigators said bribes and kickbacks were
paid to prospective patients who agreed to
sign up for home health care they did not
need or never received.
On the same day as the indictment,
prosecutors filed a civil action against Ms.
Luis asking a federal judge to immediately
freeze all her assets up to $45 million.
Luis’s net worth was far less than $45
million, so the asset freeze effectively
rendered her broke.
In the space of a few hours, the federal
government had accused Luis of a major
crime and then ensured that she would be
unable to use her own money to pay lawyers
to defend her.
Luis’s lawyers argued that of the $45 million
in Medicare payments her companies had
received, she’d retained $4.5 million after
paying operating costs and other expenses.
They added that her companies had also
generated more than $15 million in revenues
unrelated to any Medicare payments.
Nonetheless, the judge determined that under
the civil forfeiture statute, prosecutors were
entitled to freeze not only tainted assets
linked directly to the alleged Medicare fraud,

but also untainted assets that could later be
substituted in any future forfeiture order if
Luis was convicted of the Medicare fraud.
“By freezing even a defendant’s untainted
assets before trial, the government not only
cripples a defendant’s ability to retain private
counsel, but also takes from her the funds she
would otherwise invest in her defense for the
best and most industrious investigators,
experts, paralegals, and law clerks, to at least
attempt to match the litigation support
available to the United States Attorney’s
Office,” her lawyer argued, urging the federal
judge to reject the government’s freeze
request.
The judge disagreed. He issued a restraining
order, effectively freezing all of Luis’s
assets.
Luis appealed the ruling. A panel of the
Atlanta-based Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the judge’s decision.
In taking their case to the US Supreme Court,
lawyers for Luis argue that the lower court
decisions raise significant constitutional
issues about the right to obtain counsel in the
face of aggressive government forfeiture
tactics.
“The restraint of untainted assets needed to
retain counsel poses a serious threat to the
constitutional right to counsel of choice and
the balance of forces in a criminal case,”
Miami lawyer Howard Srebnick writes in his
petition urging the high court to take up the
case.
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“A statute that dispossesses a presumptively
innocent defendant of her untainted assets
before trial – denying her the financial ability
to retain counsel – should be of great concern
to this court,” he said.

“If petitioner’s position were adopted, then a
defendant could effectively deprive her
victim of any opportunity for compensation
simply by dissipating her ill-gotten gains,” he
said.

In response to the petition, US Solicitor
General Donald Verrilli said the high court’s
review of the Luis case was unwarranted.

In response, Mr. Srebnick says the
government has it backward: The Sixth
Amendment protects the right of a defendant
to use her untainted assets to hire a lawyer
without interference from prosecutors
seeking to render her broke and resourceless
on the eve of a criminal trial.

“A statutorily authorized restraint on a
defendant’s assets does not violate the
Constitution if the government has shown
probable cause to believe that those assets are
forfeitable,” Mr. Verrilli said.
The solicitor general said that the high court
had established in prior cases that there is a
strong governmental interest in obtaining full
recovery of federal funds obtained through
fraud. He said that strong interest “trumps
any Sixth Amendment interest in permitting
criminals to use assets adjudged forfeitable to
pay for their defense.”
Verrilli said the key distinction is not whether
assets are tainted or not tainted. The key
distinction is whether they are forfeitable or
nonforfeitable, he said.
He said Luis’s untainted assets could be
frozen because the judge in the case had
found probable cause to believe that she had
spent some of the proceeds of the alleged
Medicare fraud on luxury items and travel.
“Petitioner’s desire to spend the substitute
assets to hire counsel does not trump the
strong governmental interest in obtaining full
recovery of all forfeitable assets,” Verrilli
said.

In a friend-of-the-court brief urging the
justices to take up the case, appellate lawyer
William Olson said asset forfeiture is
growing exponentially as an abusive crimefighting tool.
“Asset forfeiture has become the tip of the
spear wielded by prosecutors against
Americans in a federal criminal justice
system designed to extract guilty pleas and
collect financial awards,” he wrote.
“Giving the federal government the power to
seize tainted assets of a defendant ... is a
fearsome power, but can be understood if the
assets seized are the fruits of the crime,” he
said.
“It is quite another to grant the government
the power to seize the assets of a defendant
which are unrelated to the crime,” Mr. Olson
wrote.
He said it is unseemly and unjust for the
government to impoverish those it prosecutes
in order to disable their defense at trial.
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